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THE CASE FOR SYMMETRY IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION
LAW
NAOMI SCHOENBAUM*
Antidiscrimination law faces a fundamental design question: the
choice between symmetry and asymmetry. A symmetrical law prohibits
discrimination on the basis of a trait for a universal class of persons, and for
both "sides" of the trait. An asymmetrical law prohibits discrimination on
the basis of one "side" of the trait, and for a limited class of persons.
Current law is inconsistent in its design. For example, employment
discrimination law prohibits race discrimination symmetrically (everyone is
protected, and on the basis of any race), but prohibits disability
discrimination asymmetrically (only the disabled are protected, and only on
the basis of disability). This critical design choice has received scant
attention outside of the affirmative action context, leaving this key
inconsistency in current law unexplained, and the implications unexplored.
Relying on employment discrimination law and the traits of race, sex,
disability, and age as core examples, this Article provides the first
systematic study of this design choice. It makes the case for symmetry on
three grounds: purpose, practice, and politics. As for the purpose of
antidiscrimination law, this Article reaches the counterintuitive conclusion
that a symmetrical design that protects everyone is effective not only at
reducing classifications on the basis of protected traits, but also at
improving the labor market circumstances of subordinated groups. When it
comes to practice, a symmetrical law avoids challenges arising from
protected-class determinations that limit plaintiffs' ability to pursue their
claims. Finally, symmetrical antidiscrimination laws are more likely to
produce positive policy feedback, generating greater support for these laws.
After discussing how to optimize symmetry, this Article explores further
applications, including additional traits-such as appearance and sexual
orientation-and additional areas of law-such as housing, education, and
constitutional law.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2015, Senator Tom Harkin, a key proponent of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA),' shared the experience of his deaf brother
becoming employed at a factory. 2 After having the chance to show his
worth as a worker, Harkin's brother performed quite well.3 In fact, as
Harkin explained, the employer was so impressed with the special
ability that his brother's condition conferred-avoiding the noise and
distraction of the factory-that he might prefer deaf workers to hearing

1.
2.
Employment
Years Panel
2015).
3.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (2012).
See Tom Harkin, Senator, U.S. Senate, Introductory Remarks at the
Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act at Twenty-Five
of the American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 3,
Id.
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workers in the future.' Although the ADA bars employers from
discriminating against the disabled, an employer who favors the
disabled to the non-disabled faces no legal barrier in doing so.'
In contrast, consider a similar case in the context of sex. An
employer prefers women rather than men to fill the job of flight
attendant because it believes that women are "superior in such nonmechanical aspects of the job as providing reassurance to anxious
passengers, giving courteous personalized service and, in general,
making flights as pleasurable as possible . . . ."6 Here, however, such
preferences are unlawful, as the prohibition on sex discrimination bans
not only discrimination against women in favor of men, but also
discrimination against men in favor of women.'
These examples highlight a critical design choice for every
antidiscrimination law, what this Article terms the choice between
symmetry and asymmetry. Under a symmetrical law like Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,8 which bans discrimination on the basis of
sex, antidiscrimination protection applies to everyone on the basis of
the protected trait.9 Under an asymmetrical law like the ADA,
antidiscrimination protection applies only to a limited class-those
identified as disadvantaged-and only on the basis of the disadvantaged
"side" of the classification.' 0 Antidiscrimination law is divided on this
crucial question, with, for example, employment discrimination law
4.
See id.; Linda Federico-O'Murchu, How Employers Are Tapping Talents
of
Disabled
Workers,
CNBC
(July
24,
2014,
8:24
AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101867230 [https://perma.cc/EJR9-UX6G] (documenting how
employers prefer autistic employees for some positions because "[tiraits like extreme
mathematical, scientific and mechanical aptitude are so coveted by certain industries
that accompanying conditions, such as social anxiety, have become an accepted part of
the equation").
5.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(g) ("Nothing in [the ADA] shall provide the basis
for a claim by an individual without a disability that the individual was subject to
discrimination because of the individual's lack of disability."); Reassignment; Reverse
Discrimination;Paralysis, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DIsABILYTY L. REP. 612, 612 (1992)
(highlighting Ortner v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., No. 91 CA 3146 (D.C. Super. Ct.
Sept. 10, 1992), a case dismissing a discrimination suit brought by an able-bodied
employee denied promotion by Paralyzed Veterans of America because he was not
disabled).
6.
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1971)
(internal quotations omitted).
7.
See, e.g., Scott v. Parkview Mem'l Hosp., 175 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 1999);
Longariellov. Sch. Bd. of Monroe Cty., 987 F. Supp. 1440, 1448-49 (S.D. Fla. 1997),
aff'd, 161 F.3d 21 (11th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. El Paso Cty., 710 F.2d 1102, 1104
(5th Cir. 1983). The only exception is when sex is a "bona fide occupational
qualification" for the position. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
8.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15).
9.
Id. at 255-56.
10.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(g).
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treating race and sex symmetrically, and disability and age
asymmetrically."
No law or scholarship explains, let alone justifies, the current
divide in the design of antidiscrimination law or its consequences.1 2 One
might attempt to explain the divide based on varying levels of
constitutional scrutiny. The traits that are protected symmetrically are
subject to heightened scrutiny, 13 and some degree of symmetry might be
demanded there.14 But this does not explain current law, 15-nor, more

11.
Compare McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280,
286-87 (1976) (holding that race discrimination protection is symmetrical under Title
VII), and Martinez, 710 F.2d at 1104 (same for sex), with 42 U.S.C. § 12201(g)
(making clear that the ADA is asymmetrical), and Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v.
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 584 (2004) (same for age under federal age discrimination law).
12.
Scholars have only addressed the question piecemeal, focusing on one
protected trait, see, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and
"Disability," 86 VA. L. REv. 397, 398 (2000) (disability); Cary Franklin, The Antistereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex DiscriminationLaw, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv.
83, 104-06 (2010) (sex); Michael A. Stein et al., Accommodating Every Body, 81 U.
CHI. L. REv. 689, 721-26 (2014) (disability), or on one cause of action, see, e.g.,
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, When Diferent Means the Same: Applying a Different
Standardof Proof to White Plaintiffs Under the McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case
Test, 50 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 53 (1999) (Title VII disparate treatment); Charles
Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: DisparateImpact Claims by White Males,
98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1505, 1550-55 (2004) (Title VII disparate impact).
13.
Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494-95
(1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (holding that race classifications are subject to
heightened scrutiny), and Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)
(same for sex), with City of Cleburne v. CleburneLiving Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442
(1985) (holding that disability classifications are subject to rational basis review), and
Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (same for age).
14.
Because heightened scrutiny applies equally to malign and benign
classifications, see Croson, 488 U.S. at 494-95, a law that treated advantaged and
disadvantaged groups differently, even to help the latter, might not pass constitutional
muster, especially for race classifications, which are subject to stricter scrutiny than sex
classifications. Compare Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact:
Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REv. 493, 585-86 (2003) (suggesting that such a law could
survive even under strict scrutiny after Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003),
upheld a facially classificatory regime), with Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1550-55
(suggesting that such a law might fail). See infra note 37 and accompanying text for
further discussion. Because this Article proposes more rather than less symmetry, it
poses fewer constitutional concerns than current law.
15.
The Supreme Court and other courts read these traits to be protected
symmetrically before the Court held that heightened scrutiny applied to all
classifications on the basis of these traits, and relied not at all on constitutional
arguments in doing so. Compare, e.g., McDonald, 427 U.S. at 286-87 (holding that
race discrimination protection is symmetrical on the basis of statutory text, legislative
history, and administrative practice), with Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (applying
heightened scrutiny to all race classifications). And the Constitution does nothing to
explain traits that are treated asymmetrically, as they are subject only to rational basis
review, permitting either symmetrical or asymmetrical treatment. See Cleburne, 473
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importantly, does it justify it-as constitutional treatment is not
dispositive of the normative question of what the design of
antidiscrimination law, including constitutional law, should be.
While longstanding debates about affirmative action touch on the
symmetry-asymmetry divide, they set up the choice as one between the
dueling purposes of antidiscrimination law. On the one side are the
anticlassificationists, who oppose all uses of protected classifications
and favor a symmetrical ban on any use of a protected trait, whether
the use of the protected trait harms a member of a disadvantaged or
advantaged group.' 6 On the other side are the antisubordinationists, who
oppose only those uses of a protected trait that harm the disadvantaged
group, and thus favor an asymmetrical ban that would allow only
members of the disadvantaged group to utilize the law.'" The narrow
focus of this debate has wrongly rendered symmetry synonymous with
the anticlassification view and misses the full range of consequences of
the choice between symmetry and asymmetry.
This Article untethers the choice between symmetry and
asymmetry from the stunted affirmative action debate. It makes the case
for symmetry on novel grounds, including antisubordination goals.
Before going further, a word about methodology is in order. To make
the analysis tractable, this Article focuses on one area of
antidiscrimination law-federal employment discrimination law-which
is by far the most common federal antidiscrimination claim." The
volume of cases in this area provides substantial data for studying the
impact of legal design. Within employment discrimination law, I focus
on four protected traits-race/national origin, 1 sex, age, and

U.S. at 442 (disability); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (age). See infra notes 37-40, 44 and
accompanying text for further discussion.
16.
See, e.g., William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism v. Group Rights:
The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995 (1984) (arguing that antidiscrimination
requires elimination of classifications and thus favoring symmetrical standard that
applies to all classifications).
17.
See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 109 (1976) (arguing that antidiscrimination requires a
sensitivity to whether a classification disadvantages a subordinated group and arguing
for more asymmetry on this basis).
18.
See Theodore Eisenberg, Four Decades of Federal Civil Rights
Litigation, 12 J. EMPERICAL L. STUDS. 4, 5 & n. 13 (2015) (documenting that litigation
under "the employment [discrimination] statutes has constituted the largest fraction of
the nonprisoner federal civil docket"). I address other areas of law, and whether the
conclusions drawn from employment are generalizable, in infra Part HI.C.2.
19.
I treat these traits together as it can be difficult to disentangle whether
discrimination is on the basis of race, national origin, or both. See Sinai v. New Eng.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 3 F.3d 471, 475 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[Rlace and national origin
discrimination may present identical factual issues . . . . [and thus] may overlap");
Bullard v. OMI Ga., Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1981) ("In some contexts,
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disability-which constitute the vast majority of claims, 20 and divide
evenly between symmetrical (race/national origin and sex) and
asymmetrical (age and disability) treatment. 2 1
This Article's case for symmetry is made on three grounds:
purpose, practice, and politics. As. for purpose, the Article shows how,
in contrast to the debates surrounding affirmative action, symmetry can
serve antisubordination ends. First, by providing universal protection, a
symmetrical law can avoid one well-recognized problem of
asymmetrical laws: that they make members of the protected groupthe disadvantaged group-more expensive to employ, thereby
counterproductively harming their employment prospects. 22 Second, a
symmetrical law more effectively combats subordinating stereotypes by
allowing them to be challenged when they are exercised in mirrorimage form against privileged groups.23 Finally, even members of
advantaged groups can face pockets of systematic disadvantage, for
example, younger workers denied promotions,24 or men excluded from
caring professions.25 Only a symmetrical law allows disadvantage to be
challenged in all of its manifestations.26 As for practice, a symmetrical
law avoids the need for the plaintiff to establish membership in the
protected class at the outset of each case, a hurdle that has unduly
restricted understandings of discrimination and plaintiffs' ability to
national origin discrimination is so closely related to racial discrimination as to be
indistinguishable.").
20.
See
Charge
Statistics:
FY
1997
Through
FY
2016,
U.S.

EQUAL

EMP.

OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION

(EEOC),

http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/6EMYU6GF] (last visited Feb. 21, 2017). This excludes the bases of religion, color, and
genetic information, which are also protected by federal employment discrimination
law, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (religion and color); id. § 2000ff-1(a) (genetic
information), but make up only a small fraction of claims, see EEOC, supra (showing
that religion claims make up approximately 3% of claims; color claims make up
approximately 2% of claims; and genetic claims make up approximately 0.3% of
claims).
21.
See supra note 11.
22.
See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REv. 223,
227 (2000); infra Part II.A.2.a.
23.
See Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 629-30 (4th Cir. 2001)
(addressing a claim of a male plaintiff alleging discrimination based on his supervisor
denying child-care leave because "there is no way [he] could be [the] primary care
[giver]" unless his wife was "in a coma or dead," thereby challenging stereotype of
both male breadwinner and female caregiver); infra Part II.A.2.b.
24.
See, e.g., Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 947 (N.J.
1999) (twenty-five-year-old man demoted from vice president position after his
employer learned of his age).
25.
See, e.g., Evans v. Prinicipi, No. Civ.A 02-2258(GK), 2005 WL
485743, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2005) (male nurse claiming sex discrimination after
supervisor telling him that he "doesn't belong here").
26.
See infra Part II.A.2.c.
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prove their claims.2 7 Moreover, the protected-class hurdle, which
requires a judicial determination of a plaintiffs identity, is increasingly
out of place in an era where the likes of Caitlyn Jenner and Rachel
Dolezal complicate static notions of protected class membership and
necessitate a more fluid understanding of identity.28 As for politics, a
symmetrical law that provides universal benefits is more likely to
generate positive policy feedback that increases support for the law.29
After setting forth the case for symmetry, this Article considers a
move towards more symmetry in antidiscrimination law. Weighing the
benefits of symmetry with its potential costs, I conclude that, while the
benefits vary by trait, a symmetrical approach is recommended for each
trait. None of the concerns critics might raise-undermining the
expressive function of the law, increasing costs imposed by the law, or
interfering with affirmative action or disparate impact-should trouble
us. In light of the significant benefits of symmetry, this Article
proposes not only that currently asymmetrical law-the protections
against disability and age discrimination-should be made symmetrical,
but that even currently symmetrical law-the protections against race,
national origin, and sex discrimination-should be made more
symmetrical, and proposes how to do so. Finally, the Article expands
its focus, offering thoughts on how the analysis would apply to
additional traits that are the subject of pending legislation-appearance
and sexual orientation-and additional areas of law-education,
housing, and constitutional law.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, this Article defines
its key terms-symmetry and asymmetry-and explains how they map
on to current law. Part II catalogues the benefits of symmetry for the
purpose, practice, and politics of antidiscrimination law. After
evaluating the benefits and costs of symmetry, Part III addresses the
optimal level of symmetry, and says a few words about how the
analysis of Part II would apply to additional protected traits and areas
of law.
I. SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY

This Part introduces the symmetry-asymmetry design choice by
defining the constituent features of symmetry and asymmetry. It sets
forth a typology of protected traits-binary, discrete, and continuousand explains how symmetry and asymmetry applies to each. This Part
then explains how these definitions map on to current law, which,

27.
28.
29.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
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among the four primary bases for claims-race/national origin, sex,
age, and disability-splits evenly between symmetrical and
asymmetrical protections.
A. Definitions and Typology
An antidiscrimination law may adopt either a symmetrical or
asymmetrical design. Two features distinguish a symmetrical from an
asymmetrical law: the direction of discrimination prohibited, and the
scope of the protected class. I illustrate these concepts using the
example of sex discrimination. As for direction, the law could ban
discrimination on the basis of any sex, or on the basis of either female
or male sex. As for protected class, the law could protect everyone
from discrimination on the basis of sex (a universal protected class), or
it could limit protection to just women or just men (a limited protected
class). This Article uses the term symmetrical to describe an
antidiscrimination law that does not limit the scope of persons who are
protected on the basis of a given trait, nor does it limit the direction of
discrimination prohibited. This Article uses the term asymmetrical to
describe an antidiscrimination law that limits the scope of persons who
are protected on the basis of the trait, as well as the direction of
discrimination prohibited.
This Article applies this same terminology not only to binary
classifications, like sex, but to classifications with multiple discrete
permutations, and to classifications that fall along a continuous
spectrum (see Table 1). Binary protected traits are those in which the
trait can be divided into two groups. Traditionally at least, the sex
classification divides persons into male and female. 30 Discrete protected
30.
This Article hews to the accepted usage of sex to describe a biological
phenomenon and gender to describe a sociological expression. Even on the biological
level, it may be more accurate to view sex as a 'lumpy' spectrum, with most persons
clearly male or female, but with a small number who fall between these two categories,
either phenotypically, as a result of ambiguous genitalia, or genetically, as a result of
multiple or missing sex chromosomes. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating
Genderfrom Sex and Sexual Orientation:The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 16 n.36 (1995).
At the sociological level, one conception of gender identity would view it as
existing along a continuous spectrum from masculine to feminine, regardless of
biological sex. See id. at 18-28. Another conception of gender identity would view it as
discrete, with groupings of cis men, cis women, agender, bigender, gender-fluid,
transgender, and so on. See Debby Herbenick & Aleta Baldwin, What Each of
Facebook's 51 New Gender Options Means, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 15, 2014, 4:45 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/02/15/the-complete-glossary-of-facebook-s51-gender-options.html [https://perma.cc/UT59-PUQ4]. Finally, the prevalence and
increasing acceptance of transgenderism also complicates the male-female sex binary,
with persons increasingly blurring the line. I return to this point in discussing the
practical consequences of the choice between symmetry and asymmetry, and
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traits are those that contain multiple discrete groups within the
classification. Although each discrete group might exist along a
spectrum, there are dividing lines that can be drawn between the
multiple groupings that exist within the classification. Examples of
discrete protected traits include race, national origin, and disability.
Race includes groupings of Asian, black, Native American, and white.
While there is a spectrum within each grouping of those who might
identify as more or less black, or more or less Asian (e.g., someone
who is multiracial), we can at least draw rough lines around the various
races. So too with national origin and disability. Continuous protected
traits are those in which the trait exists along a spectrum with no clear
breaking points dividing the different permutations of the trait. Age is a
continuous protected trait.
Table 1
Binary: Sex
Male

White

Female

Discrete: Race, National Origin, Disability
Asian
Native
Black
American

British
No Disability

Italian
Crohn's

Latino
Deaf

Arab
Cerebral Palsy

Disease

Continuous: Age
Young

Old

A law that banned discrimination against all persons on the basis of
any race, whether Asian, black, Native American, or white, would be
symmetrical. A law that banned discrimination against only a subset of
persons and only on the basis of black, Asian, and/or Native American
race would be asymmetrical. A law that banned discrimination against
all persons on the basis of any age, whether young or old, would be
symmetrical. A law that banned discrimination only against a subset of
persons on the basis of old age would be asymmetrical.
While symmetrical antidiscrimination laws take the protected trait
as the relevant unit of analysis for determining unlawful discrimination,
asymmetrical laws focus on a subset of the protected trait. This subset
specifically the difficulty of assessing whether a plaintiff is a member of the protected
class, in infra Part H.B.
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with which an asymmetrical law is concerned is measured by societal
laws
are designed
disadvantage."
When antidiscrimination
asymmetrically, they ban discrimination on the basis of the societally
disadvantaged trait, and limit this protection to the subset of persons
who are most likely to experience this societal disadvantage. Racial and
ethnic minorities, women, the elderly, and the disabled are the groups
that have been viewed to have been burdened in the distribution of
societal costs and benefits and thus worthy of protection under an
asymmetrical law.
The direction of protection and the scope of the protected class are
linked both in theory and in practice. Symmetrical laws adopt a
universal protected class to effectuate their universal ban on
discrimination on the basis of the protected trait. If a law symmetrically
bans discrimination on the basis of black race and on the basis of white
race, to effectuate this ban, both black and white individuals need to be
subject to its protections. By contrast, asymmetrical laws adopt a
limited protected class to effectuate their limited protections. So a law
that is meant to protect against discrimination only on the basis of black
race would limit the protected class to black persons. Indeed, at first
blush, it would not make sense to permit a universal protected class
here, as only black persons can be discriminated against on the basis of
black race. This means that asymmetrical laws must reach a definition
of a protected class.
I say at first blush because a white individual who was perceived
as black could be a candidate for protection even under an asymmetrical
law. It would be plausible then to disaggregate the scope of the
protected class from the direction of discrimination protected. While an
antidiscrimination law that bans discrimination in only one direction but
adopts a universal protected class is possible in theory, we do not see
this in practice.32 Because these features of symmetrical and
asymmetrical laws are linked in practice, I treat them as such. I return
to a more detailed discussion of the possible disaggregation of these
features when addressing the practical consequences of symmetry and

asymmetry.3

31.
While in theory, an asymmetrical law could divide groups in any number
of ways, in practice, they are divided in this way. This is best understood in terms of an
antisubordination reading of such laws, which is discussed in infra notes 57-58, 66-68
and accompanying text.
32.
Both the ADEA and ADA adopt limited protected classes. See infra notes
41-52 and accompanying text.
See infra PartI.B.
33.
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B. CurrentLaw
Federal law provides symmetrical protection against employment
discrimination on the basis of race,' national origin," and sex.3 6 The
Supreme Court held that Title VII was symmetrical in the context of
race in a surprisingly brief analysis that turned not at all on
constitutional scrutiny," but on statutory text," legislative history,39 and
administrative practice.'

34.
See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280, 28587 (1976) (holding that white persons can sue for race discrimination under Title VII
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, despite the latter's statutory text: "All persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory
to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . .") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
35.
See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973)
(indicating that national origin should be interpreted broadly to mean any country from
which the person's ancestors came).
36.
See, e.g., Martinez v. El Paso Cty., 710 F.2d 1102, 1104 (5th Cir. 1983)
(allowing a male plaintiff to raise a sex discrimination claim). Under Title VII,
pregnancy discrimination is defined as a subset of sex discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (2012). The basic protection against pregnancy discrimination is symmetrical:
both pregnant and non-pregnant workers are included within the protected class of
individuals who may file suit and claim discrimination on the basis of pregnancy status.
See Cal. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 279 (1987) (allowing
non-pregnant workers to raise claim that they were disadvantaged on the basis of nonpregnancy). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has allowed some amount of preferential
treatment of pregnant as compared with non-pregnant workers. Id. at 285 (holding that
Title VII does not preempt a state law that mandates benefits for pregnant workers and
not for non-pregnant workers because "Congress intended the [Pregnancy
Discrimination Act] to be 'a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not
drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise'").
37.
Equal protection doctrine subjects race and national origin classifications
to strict scrutiny, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion), and sex classifications to intermediate scrutiny, see
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). A classification subject to
strict scrutiny can survive only if it is "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling
government interest." Croson, 488 U.S. at 497, 507. A classification subject to
intermediate scrutiny can survive only if it furthers "important governmental
objectives" by means that are "substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724. It is perhaps unsurprising that the Court reached
the conclusion that Title VII was symmetrical without resort to the Constitution given
that a dozen years would have to pass before the Court held that race classifications for
benign purposes, such as an asymmetrical antidiscrimination law meant to benefit the
subordinated race, are subject to the same strict scrutiny as classifications for malign
purposes. Thus, the symmetrical reading of Title VII can only be explained as a matter
of constitutional law in retrospect, and does not justify the design as a normative
matter.
38.
McDonald, 427 U.S. at 278-79 (noting that Title VII's "terms are not
limited to discrimination against members of any particular race").
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It is worth spelling out what this symmetry means in practice. For
disparate treatment claims, any employee can bring a claim of
intentional discrimination on the basis of any of the traits protected by
Title VII.41 This means that whites can sue for race discrimination, men
can sue for sex discrimination, and so on. When it comes to disparate
impact, there is an open question as to whether "reverse" claims are
cognizable.42 Even if disparate impact is asymmetrical, this makes only
a small dent in the overarching symmetry of Title VII, as there are few
disparate impact cases, and even fewer in which plaintiffs prevail.43
By contrast, employment discrimination law protects the traits of
age and disability asymmetrically by protecting discrimination only in
one direction, and only against a limited protected class." So even
employer programs or policies that intentionally favor older employees
or disabled employees are not subject to challenge under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) or ADA. 45
The ADEA protects only employees who are at least forty years of
age, and only discrimination against older workers who are disfavored
as compared with younger workers." The protected class was limited

39.
Id. at 280 (recounting "uncontradicted legislative history to the effect that
Title VII was intended to 'cover white men and white women and all Americans,' and
create an 'obligation not to discriminate against whites'") (citations omitted).
40.
Id. at 279-80 (noting that the EEOC "has consistently interpreted Title
VII to proscribe racial discrimination in private employment against whites on the same
terms as racial discrimination against nonwhites") (citations omitted).
41.
Id. While anyone can raise a claim under Title VII, note that not all
courts apply the same standard of proof to "reverse" disparate treatment claims as they
do to standard disparate treatment claims. For further discussion of this point, see infra
notes 323-31 and accompanying text.
42.
See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1506-08 (arguing that the purposes of the
doctrine suggest that they should not be, but that an asymmetrical approach would raise
constitutional concerns). For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 332-36 and
accompanying text.
43.
See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53
UCLA L. REv. 701, 735, 738-40 (2006) (finding that in the span of six years, there
were only 171 reported disparate impact cases decided by district courts, and
documenting low success rates of these claims).
44.
The Constitution plays little to no role in this design choice. Both of these
traits are subject only to rational basis review. See supra note 13. This means that a law
that classifies on the basis of either of these traits is permissible so long as it is
"rationally related to a legitimate state interest." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Therefore, a symmetrical or asymmetrical law
for either of these traits would pass constitutional muster so long as there was some
minimum justification for the design choice.
45.
See Christopher J. Kuczynski, ADA & ADEA: Hiring Practices, U.S.
EQUAL

EMP.

OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION

http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/20,2/adaadea-hiring-practices.html
[https://perma.cc/TJ7U-FBGM].
46.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012).

(2012),
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by statute,47 and the direction of protection was limited later by the
Supreme Court. 8 After concluding that the ADEA's text was
ambiguous, 49 the Court relied on the legislative history, the purpose of
the law, and the context in which it was passed to decide that the
ADEA prohibits discrimination only on the basis of old age."
The ADA also protects against discrimination on the basis of
disability asymmetrically, meaning that it protects against
discrimination only on the basis of the presence of a disability, rather
than the absence of one." The ADA limits its protected class to one of
three groups: those who have an actual disability, those who are
"regarded as" disabled, and those who have a "record of" disability.52
This definition has been notoriously difficult to satisfy. The ADA also
47.
29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (limiting the protections of the ADEA "to individuals
who are at least 40 years of age").
48.
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 591 (2004)
(employees aged forty to forty-nine claiming that they were disadvantaged as compared
with older employees by reduction in health benefits that applied only to those with
later retirement dates).
49.
Id. at 586 (determining that "discriminat[ion] . . . because of [an]
individual's age," could be interpreted to ban discrimination on the basis either of old
age, or on the basis of any age) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012))).
50.
See id. at 587 (noting that the Department of Labor report that underlies
the ADEA "was devoid of any indication that the Secretary had noticed unfair
advantages accruing to older employees at the expense of their juniors"); id. at 589
("I[F]rom the voluminous records of the hearings, we have found . . . nothing
suggesting that any workers were registering complaints about discrimination in favor
of their seniors."); id. ("The findings stress the impediments suffered by older workers
. . . ."); id. at 591 ("Common experience" confirms that discrimination against
younger workers is not "a social problem requir[ing] a federal statute to place a
younger worker in parity with an older one"). But see id. at 602-03 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that the plain language of the ADEA dictates a symmetrical
reading of the law).
51.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(g) (2012) ("Nothing in this chapter shall provide the
basis for a claim by an individual without a disability that the individual was subject to
discrimination because of the individual's lack of disability.").
52.
Id. § 12102(1) ("The term 'disability' means, with respect to an
individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment . . . .").
53.
As for actual disability, many scholars agree that "courts have
inappropriately applied a restrictive definition of 'disability' to squelch ADA cases at
the summary judgment stage." Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 399; see also Robert L.
Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protectionfrom Disability Discrimination: The
Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL.
L. REv. 409, 536 (1997); Ruth Colker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Windfall
for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 99-100 (1999). Although recent
amendments to the ADA were meant to ease this burden, scholars have found that
many courts continue to construe actual disability claims quite narrowly. See, e.g.,
Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA
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defines discrimination to include an employer's failure to provide a
reasonable accommodation," but only to those who are actually
disabled or who have a record of disability (and not to those "regarded
as" disabled)."
II. THE BENEFITS OF SYMMETRY
This Part sets forth the underappreciated benefits of symmetry
along three dimensions: purpose, practice, and politics. It begins with a
reconfiguration of the choice between symmetry and asymmetry,
showing how a symmetrical law can further not only anticlassification
purposes, but also antisubordination purposes. It next turns to the
practical implications of a symmetrical or asymmetrical design, and
explains how symmetry avoids problems that arise from a limited
protected class, which complicates the discrimination inquiry and
narrows the available theories of discrimination and which plaintiffs
may proceed. Finally, this Part addresses the politics of legal design,
and argues that a symmetrical law will generate greater support for
antidiscrimination law.
Two points are worth noting before proceeding further. First, I
intentionally sidestep the question of which traits should be protected by
law, and instead simply presume that there are some traits that should
qualify. 6 Whenever we find a trait worthy of special protection, we are
Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 2027, 2065-66 (2013); Stein et al., supra
note 12, at 721-26.
As for "regarded as" disabled, the ADA does not permit anyone to bring this
claim, but narrows it to those who have an actual or perceived substantially limiting
impairment that is not minor and transitory. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (defining
"regarded as" disabled as having "an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment
whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity"); §
12102(3)(B) (excepting impairments that are "transitory and minor," and defining a
"transitory impairment" as one "with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or
less"). Courts' unduly restrictive approach to interpreting the definition of disability
extends to the "regarded-as" prong. See Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regardfor the
"RegardedAs" Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VWL. L. Rev. 587,
588-89 (1997). Again, despite statutory amendments, many courts continue to construe
regarded-as disability claims narrowly. See, e.g., Befort, supra, at 2063; Stein et al.,
supra note 12, at 726-27; Deborah A. Widiss, Still Kickin' After All These Years:
Sutton and Toyota As Shadow Precedents, 63 DRAKE L. REv. 919, 942-46 (2015)
(documenting how courts continue to apply restrictive definition of "regarded as" prong
even post-amendment).
54.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (including within the definition of
discrimination "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . unless ...
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship").
55.
§ 12201(h).
56.
A variety of considerations are thought to be relevant to whether a treat
warrants special protection in law. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406
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faced with whether to protect the trait symmetrically or asymmetrically.
Second, each of the benefits discussed below does not apply equally
across protected traits. In this Part, I rely on examples across protected
traits to make clear the benefit at hand. In the next Part, I address these
benefits on a trait-by-trait basis to evaluate how each trait fares under
this analysis.
A. Purpose
Two primary theories underlie antidiscrimination law: the
anticlassification theory and the antisubordination theory." Under an
anticlassification view, the wrong of discrimination is in "classify[ing]
people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden
category: for example, their race."" The most familiar instantiation of
this view is one of so-called "trait-blindness," which is skeptical of
classifications made on the basis of a protected trait, even when
classifications are made for benign purposes.59 The antisubordination
view, by contrast, maintains that the wrong of discrimination is in
"practices that enforce the secondary social status of historically
oppressed groups. "6 An antisubordinationist regime would accept and
even encourage classifications that expand opportunities for members of
traditionally subordinated groups. 61
I do not seek to choose between the anticlassification and
antisubordination rationales for antidiscrimination law. While symmetry
has been aligned with the anticlassification perspective, my aim is to
show how antisubordination purposes can also be furthered by a

.

U.S. 164, 165 (1972) (holding that immutable characteristics, or "accidents of birth,"
should be protected because they are unrelated to individual responsibility); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that
protection should apply when "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . .
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities"); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal.
2008) (holding that protection should apply to traits that are "so integral an aspect of
one's identity, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change [them] in
order to avoid discriminatory treatment"). In infra Part III.C.1, I address additional
traits that have been protected in some jurisdictions.
57.
See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights
Tradition: Anticlassificationor Antisubordiantion?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 9 (2003).
See id. at 10.
58.
59.
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (in the context of a school assignment program that
considered race to promote integration, stating that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race"); Reynolds, supra note
16, at 998 (discussing the application of "colorblindness" in the context of school
desegregation).
60.
Balkin & Siegel, supra note 57, at 9.
61.
See Fiss, supra note 17, at 159-60.
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symmetrical design. First, by offering universal protection, a
symmetrical law avoids a key shortcoming of asymmetrical laws: that
they increase the cost of employing members of the disadvantaged
group, thereby damaging their employment prospects, precisely
contrary to the goal of such laws. Second, stereotypes that hold
subordinated groups back are exercised not only against subordinated
workers themselves, but also, in mirror-image form, against privileged
groups. Failing to permit privileged groups to challenge these
stereotypes limits the law's ability to dismantle them. Finally, the
advantaged and disadvantaged groups cannot always be neatly divided,
and only a symmetrical law permits the flexibility to combat
subordination in its heterogeneous manifestations. I first briefly explain
how symmetry furthers anticlassification objectives, and then set forth
the novel case for how symmetry can also further antisubordination
objectives.
1. ANTICLASSIFICATION

The primary concern underlying the anticlassification view is with
treating an individual as an individual rather than on the basis of a
protected trait. The anticlassification view has long been associated
with a symmetrical regime, because the only way to challenge all
classifications on the basis of a protected trait is to allow claims for
discrimination by both "sides" of the protected trait.62 Earlier
justifications for the anticlassification view focused on the unfairness of
limiting important opportunities on the basis of a protected trait,
whether it is to the disadvantaged or advantaged side." It is obvious
that symmetry is necessary to avoid this harm of unfairness. If the
nature of the trait is such that relying on it in any way to distribute
important benefits is unfair, then avoiding this unfairness requires a law

62.
Note that although anticlassificationists would, at a minimum, support a
symmetrical antidiscrimination regime, the anticlassification approach and the
symmetry approach are not identical. While anticlassification absolutists would ban all
classifications on the basis of a protected trait, symmetry would simply require that
whatever doctrines apply to one group should apply equally across all groups. So
whereas anticlassification absolutists would ban affirmative action and disparate impact,
symmetry absolutists would argue that affirmative action and disparate impact should be
available to all on equal terms. I return to this distinction in infra Part III.B. 1.
63.
See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (Powell,
J., plurality opinion) (critiquing affirmative action plan because of unfairness based on
harms to "innocent people"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294
n.34 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) ("One should not lightly dismiss the inherent
unfairness of . . . a system of allocating benefits and privileges on the basis of skin
color and ethnic origin."); Reva B. Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind
Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v. Texas, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29, 37 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998).
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that bans classifications on the basis of the trait symmetrically, allowing
members of both disadvantaged and advantaged groups to challenge
discriminatory classifications.
Later iterations of the anticlassification purpose focus more on the
stereotyping harms that classifications impose on disadvantaged
groups.' Classifying on the basis of a protected trait reinforces the
salience of group membership rather than the qualities of the individual
in her own right.65 Here, too, a symmetrical design that allows
employees from either "side" of the trait to challenge classifications is
necessary to avoid these harms. For an employer to disfavor white
employees, the employer must distinguish employees on the basis of
race, thereby making race salient to the employer. And the justification
for the race-based distinction must rely on some feature believed to be
common to all members of a particular race, which reinforces
stereotypical thinking rather than individualized assessments.66 Under
asymmetrical laws, these decisions would never be challenged.
While these concerns have been raised primarily in the context of
affirmative action programs, we can see broader application in the
choice between symmetry and asymmetry. For example, in the context
of disability, technology firms have begun to prefer individuals with
autism for positions that require high levels of concentration and
attention to detail, like software testing and data conversion. Targeting
workers based on their disability rather than their skills relies on
stereotypes. While these stereotypes-such as mathematical or other
technical skills-may seem benign, they reinforce stereotypical thinking
See Siegel, supra note 63, at 38 (explaining that later equal protection
64.
jurisprudence described the harm of racial classifications to be how they "can injure
racial minorities").
See ParentsInvolved in Cinty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
65.
701, 746 (2007) (explaining that racial classifications "reinforce the belief, held by too
many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of
their skin") (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993)); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (failing
to apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications "effectively assures that race will
always be relevant in American life"); Burgdorf, supra note 53, at 525 ("The
classification . . . of people with disabilities as a distinctive status group in society is
not merely a cause of discrimination, it is the 'wellspring' and the 'essence' of
discrimination on the basis of disability.") (footnotes omitted).
In the context of affirmative action, there has been a particular concern
66.
that such programs stigmatize their intended beneficiaries. See Metro Broad., Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 618 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that race-based
affirmative action program justified by the view that a minority is "likely to provide [a]
distinct perspective . . . impermissibly value[d] individuals" based on a presumption
that "persons think in a manner associated with their race") (internal quotations
omitted); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (explaining that "[c]lassifications based on race
carry a danger of stigmatic harm").
67.
See Federico-O'Murchu, supra note 4.
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about the abilities and characteristics of someone with that disability. So
these workers may be assumed to be skilled at certain tasks, but they
may also be assumed to have the negative traits that go along with their
condition, such as problems socializing and associating with their
supervisors and coworkers.6 The anticlassification perspective judges
these classifications as harmful, despite their benign purpose, precisely
because they reinforce this type of group-based thinking. Only a
symmetrical law allows these classifications to be challenged.
2. ANTISUBORDINATION
The antisubordination rationale views the purpose of
antidiscrimination law to be the eradication of policies that contribute to
the subordination of disadvantaged groups. 69 Note that the focus is on
individuals as members of groups rather than as individuals." Unlike
advocates of the anticlassification view, the antisubordination camp has
advocated for a more asymmetrical approach to antidiscrimination
law. In this Section, I argue instead that symmetry better furthers the
goal of antisubordination by reducing the negative distributive
consequences of employment mandates that protect only the
disadvantaged group; by allowing interlocking stereotypes of
advantaged and disadvantaged groups to be challenged from both sides;
and by recognizing systematic pockets of disadvantage that even
privileged groups face.
a. Costs of Mandates
Many in the antisubordination camp assume that a law protecting
the subordinated group will have positive distributive effects on these
workers, in terms of raising employment levels and wages. However,
mandating protection for an identifiable group of workers can backfire,
harming the disadvantaged group that the law is meant to help. This is
because an asymmetrical mandate makes the protected group of
workers more expensive to employ, which can lead to reduced

68.
69.

See id.
For additional examples of antisubordination theories, see DERRICK BELL,
AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); KENNETH
L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1989); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAw 32-45 (1987).

70.
Indeed, Fiss calls the antisubordination view the "group-disadvantaging
principle." Fiss, supra note 17, at 108.
71.
See id. at 159.
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employment levels and wages for these workers.72 A symmetrical law
can reduce or eliminate these negative distributive consequences, better
fulfilling the antisubordination purpose.
In his classic article, Professor Lawrence Summers formalized a
framework for understanding the effects of employer mandates directed
to workers as a whole, which I refer to as universal mandates.7 3 Under
a supply-and-demand framework of the labor market, Summers showed
that there is little hope that these mandates redistribute resources from
employers to employees .7 Assume that employers are required to bear
the entire cost of the mandated benefit. This will have effects on both
the demand and supply of labor. As for demand, employers will
demand less labor because the mandate makes labor more costly
(reflected in a shift of the labor demand curve Do to Di in Figure 1). As
for supply, employees will supply more labor because the mandated
benefit is a form of additional (typically nonmonetary) compensation.
The labor supply curve will shift by the amount that employees value
the benefit (reflected in a shift from So to either of the Si curves). This
leads to an equilibrium of reduced wages, but employment levels may
increase or decrease, depending on how employees value the benefit.
The shift to Si' reflects a low employee valuation; the shift to Si"
reflects a high employee valuation. Either way, systematic
redistribution from employer to employees is unlikely, because "the

72.
See Jolls, supra note 22, at 227. While Jolls makes the point in the
context of accommodation mandates, antidiscrimination mandates impose many of the
same costs on employers, including the critical cost of litigation. See Daron Acemoglu
& Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. EcON. 915, 919-20 (2001); Joanna N.
Lahey, International Comparison of Age DiscriminationLaws, 32 REs. ON AGING 679,
682 (2010); Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
1, 55 (2005). Indeed, Jolls herself suggests in the context of the ADA that it may be the
costs associated with the law's antidiscrimination mandate, rather than the cost of
accommodations, that lead to the consequences she describes. See Jolls, supra note 22,
at 277. Therefore, we can expect similar effects with any employment discrimination
law, regardless of whether it requires accommodations. See infra notes 118-119
(discussing the negative distributive consequences of the ADEA, even though it has no
accommodation mandate).
73.
See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated
Benefits, 79 AM. EcON. REv. 177, 180-81 (1989). While this framework remains
widely accepted as a theoretical matter, some empirical research has reached contrary
results. Compare David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A
Case Study of the Fast-FoodIndustry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania:Reply, 90 AM.
EcoN. REv. 1397 (2000) (finding no effect of increased minimum wage on employment
levels), with David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages and Employment: A
Case Study of the Fast-FoodIndustry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Comment, 90
AM. ECON. REV. 1362 (2000) (reaching opposite conclusion).
74.
Summers, supra note 73, at 182.
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more a mandated benefit is worth to workers, the more wages will
decline when it is provided. "7
FIGURE 1
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As Professor Christine Jolls has explained, this analysis changes
when a mandate affects only a subset of workers rather than all
workers. Mandates that protect a limited class typically also bar
employers from discriminating against the protected class in hiring and
wages. In theory, then, Summers's predictions should not hold, because
it would be unlawful for employers to respond to the mandate by failing
to hire employees from the protected group or pay them less." But Jolls
recognizes that the actual distributive consequences of a mandate
75.
Dwight R. Lee, Why Workers Should Want Mandated Benefits to Lower
Their Wages, 34 EcON. INQUIRY 401, 402 (1996); see also Jolls, supra note 22, at 237
("As the value of the mandated benefit rises, the amount of the cost that is shifted to
workers in the form of reduced wages rises as well, limiting the possibility for
distributive gains.").
76.
See Jolls, supra note 22, at 240-53.
77.
See id.
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depends on whether it effectively constrains employers from
discriminating against the protected group in hiring or pay. If it does,
the law will have the intended positive distributive effect on the
protected group; if it does not, the law will have a negative distributive
effect on the protected group.7
Jolls explains that because of the ineffectiveness of protections
against hiring discrimination,o we can assume that, in the general case,
only the ban on wage discrimination constrains." If wage but not hiring
discrimination bans are effective, the employment levels of the
protected workers will fall.' But in cases of significant occupational
segregation, such as by sex, we can expect that hiring but not wage
discrimination bans are effective. 3 In such cases, we can instead expect
antidiscrimination mandates to leave the employment level of the
protected group relatively unaffected, but to reduce wages." Those
interested in the antisubordination goals of employment discrimination
law would be quite rightly concerned about a law with either of these
negative distributive consequences.
Note that these consequences turn on the protected trait being
discernible to the employer. If a trait is highly visible, like sex,
decisionmakers can easily make hiring or pay decisions on the basis of
the trait (so long as the law is not constraining). If a trait is not highly
visible, this is made more difficult. When a protected trait is truly
invisible, even an asymmetrical antidiscrimination mandate will not
have the negative consequence on the protected group that Professor
Jolls posits." Of the traits under analysis, disability is the most affected
by visibility, as some instances of disability are invisible or difficult to
discern. While this impairs decisionmakers' ability to discriminate
perfectly, they can still discriminate against those with discernible

78.
See id. at 254-61.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. at 263-71; see also Naomi Schoenbaum, It's Time that You Know:
The Shortcomings of Ignorance as Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an
"Information-Shifting" Model, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 99, 125-26 (2007)
(documenting reasons why bans on hiring discrimination are ineffective).
81.
Jolls, supra note 22, at 227-28.
82.
Id. at 228.
83.
See id. at 268-70. When an occupation is filled with primarily women,
employers will continue to hire women, but will be able to pay them less because they
will have few male comparators that would allow them to prove a wage discrimination
claim.
84.
See id. at 290-99.
85.
Id.
86.
Many physical conditions that might be considered disabilities are not
visible, including diabetes, high blood pressure, epilepsy, HIV/AIDS, and cystic
fibrosis, similarly to a host of mental disabilities.
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disabilities, in which case Jolls' analysis applies." I follow Jolls in
assuming that a sufficiently large number of disabilities are visible such
that an asymmetrical law would lead to negative employment
consequences for disabled persons."
It is important to note that Jolls applies her analysis of targeted
accommodation mandates even to symmetrical laws that cover all
workers if such laws are used disproportionately by one group. 8 9 This
means that she includes as an accommodation mandate the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA),90 even though it is symmetrical, because
women use the law's parental leave accommodation more than men. 9
In so doing, Jolls relies on a rational actor model that assumes not only
that employers know the law, but that they know the usage of the law,
and incorporate this knowledge into their decisionmaking. Under this
view, so long as one group disproportionately relies on an
antidiscrimination mandate, the fact that the mandate is formally
symmetrical is not relevant in analyzing the employer's response to the
law and the resulting distributive consequences.
Here is where I part company with Jolls. I assume instead a model
of bounded rationality, under which information is costly,' and
"human cognitive abilities are not infinite. "9 The perceptions of
boundedly rational decisionmakers then are shaped by limited access to
information and subject to cognitive shortcomings that bias the

87.
Note that the ADA bans inquiries about ability and disability at the hiring
stage except as to the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(2) (2012).
88.
SeeJolls, supra note 22, at 273-82.
89.
Id.
90.
29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2654 (2012).
91.
Jolls, supra note 22, at 232, 290. While more women take FMLA leave
following the birth of a child, the FMLA also allows employees to take leave to care
for older children, spouses, and parents, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), as well as for their
own medical conditions, id. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Between these forms of leave, FMLA
leave is now taken in almost equal measure by women and men: fifty-six percent
women and forty-four percent men. NAT'L P'SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, A LOOK AT
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S 2012 FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT EMPLOYEE
AND WORKSITE SURVEYS
1 (2013), http://www.nationalparmership.org/research-

library/work-family/fmla/dol-fmla-survey-key-fmdings-2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DQQ6-244Q].
92.
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 214 (1995).
93.
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998). Given that
Jolls' later research includes some of the seminal work incorporating behavioral
economics into legal analysis, see generally id., she may not disagree with my
application of bounded rationality here. Her earlier work simply does not consider these
arguments.
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processing of information.94 Under this view, a symmetrical as
compared with an asymmetrical law can prompt different employer
responses, and thus can have different distributive consequences, even
if one group of employees disproportionately uses the law. If a
decisionmaker believes that members of the advantaged group make
equivalent or substantial use of a symmetrical law, regardless of
whether they actually do, this is enough to reduce or eliminate the
negative distribute consequences.
Importantly, this beneficial impact of symmetry does not turn on
an employer believing that the advantaged and disadvantaged groups
use the antidiscrimination law in exactly equal measure. Symmetry can
mitigate the negative distributive consequences of an antidiscrimination
law so long as the employer believes that the advantaged group uses the
law, even if with less frequency than the disadvantaged group. Any use
by the advantaged group will increase the cost of employing members
of that group, closing the gap between the cost of employing the
advantaged and disadvantaged groups, and thereby reducing the
disincentive to hire the disadvantaged group. So even if an employer
does not believe, for example, that white employees are as likely to sue
under Title VII as black employees, the benefit of symmetry is not fully
lost so long as the employer believes that whites make some use of the
law. The amount of the benefit derived from symmetry will turn on the
employer's perception of how often the advantaged group relies on the
law, with a perception of more substantial usage associated with a more
substantial benefit.
Despite bounded rationality, there is good reason to believe that
decisionmakers would be informed about the basic provisions of the law
that governs their decisionmaking, including whether a law is
symmetrical or asymmetrical. This information is easy to acquire, and
would likely be part of an employer's equal employment opportunity
training." By contrast, decisionmakers are far less likely to have
information about the actual usage of symmetrical employment
discrimination laws. As an initial matter, this data is not easily
accessible.' And because making hiring or pay decisions on the basis
94.
Id. (describing how such shortcomings mean that "actual decisions"
under bounded rationality "often violate the axioms of expected utility theory");
Eisenberg, supra note 92, at 214 (explaining that "human rationality is normally
bounded by limited information and limited information processing" and thus that
"actors will adopt selective search and processing procedures").
95.
See generally Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination:A StructuralApproach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458 (2001) (discussing the
role of employer practices, including such trainings, in employment discrimination
law).
96.
The data is not available on the EEOC's website. It took even this
employment discrimination law scholar some time to find current statistics. In 2012,
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of protected traits is unlawful, the employer is unlikely to include this
data or guidance on how to act on it in any employer policy or training
session. Rather, the decision not to hire someone or to pay them less on
the basis of a protected identity trait is likely to be made in a
decentralized way based on each decisionmaker's perception of the
probability of a lawsuit or other costs associated with employing
members of the different groups. It is unlikely that an individual
decisionmaker acting in this capacity will access data about the
probability of a lawsuit or other costs. Expensive information-search is
made even more costly here where discovering the fact of the search
could serve as evidence of discrimination that would subject the
employer to liability. Finally, as a general matter, decisionmakers tend
to disregard probability when making a decision under uncertainty.'
Therefore, information about actual usage of symmetrical laws will not
be determinative of how employers respond to antidiscrimination
mandates.
Instead, these decisions will depend on how decisionmakers
perceive the usage of the law."9 The perception of the usage of
antidiscrimination law will differ by protected trait. One factor that
matters is the perception of how often the advantaged group faces
discrimination. For age, this is likely to lead to a perception of
significant usage of antidiscrimination law by young workers.
Decisionmakers will be aware of the generally low status accorded to
younger workers." Because decisionmakers are either young
themselves or were once young, they are likely to be familiar with the
stereotypes that younger workers face, and the challenges these
stereotypes impose." Indeed, less than half of younger workers believe

approximately 4,000 of the 33,000 race discrimination claims were filed by white
individuals and approximately 6,300 of the 30,000 sex discrimination claims were filed
by men. See Katie Kuehner-Hebert, How to Avoid Reverse Discrimination, DAILY
ExEc. (Sept./Oct. 2013), https://aptmetrics.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 11/How-toAvoid-Reverse-Discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/DP6A-THJ4].
97.
See JONATHAN BARRON, THINKING AND DECIDING 353 (2d ed. 1994)
(discussing the phenomenon of "neglect of probability" and conditions under which it
holds).
98.
We can expect that decisionmakers' perception will approximate public
perception. Given that human resources managers or EEOC compliance officers are not
typically making routine hiring and pay decisions, it is unlikely that decisionmakers will
be systematically more informed than the average person.
99.
See Graham Snowdon, Young and Older People 'Experience Age
Discrimination at Work,' GUARDIAN
(Jan.
16,
2012,
10:05
AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2012/jan/16/young-older-people-agediscrimination-work [https://perma.cc/M22W-QRKU] (citing study finding that
workers in their forties are viewed as having the highest status, while workers in their
twenties are viewed as lower status than workers in their seventies).
100.
See infra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
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that they are treated fairly on the job,o' and younger workers are more
likely to report experiencing age-related prejudice than older
"

workers.

Another factor that affects perception is media attention, and for
this reason, decisionmakers would also likely perceive a significant
volume of suits raised by men. Discrimination suits by men have been
on the rise, accounting now for twenty percent of sex discrimination
claims.' 03 But more than the actual number of suits, the media attention
to this increase in litigation matters. Given the everyday nature of sex
discrimination against women, suits brought by men garner outsize
attention, as we can see by the publicity afforded to a variety of claims
that men bring: challenges to discriminatory family-leave policies,"'
sexual harassment,'" and exclusions based on customer preferences." 7
101.
See Stephanie Armour, Young Workers Say Their Age Holds Them Back,
PM),
7,
2003,
11:20
TODAY
(Oct.
USA
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2003-10-07-reverseagex.htm
[https://perma.cc/8YAU-BXA2] (citing survey finding that just forty-four percent of
employees ages eighteen to twenty-four believe they are treated fairly).
102.
See Snowdon, supra note 99 (citing research finding those under twentyfive are at least twice as likely to have experienced age discrimination as other age
groups).
103.
See Kuehner-Hebert, supra note 96.
104.
See Associated Press, Workplace Sexual Harassment Claims by Men Are
2010,
11:32 AM),
DAiLY
NEWS
(Mar.
4,
on the Rise,
N.Y.
http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/workplace-sexual-harrassment-claims-men-risearticle-1. 170550 [https://perma.cc/NR3Y-V6SW]; Alice Gomstyn, Sexual Harassment
Claims by Men Growing but Not Equal, ABC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2010),
http://abenews.go.com/Business/TheLaw/sexual-harassment-claims-men-growingequal/story?id= 10198753 [https://perma.cc/4APP-ZWF2].
105.
See, e.g., Rich Calder, Man Sues Employer for Alleged Firing over
8:56
PM),
PosT
(Apr.
23,
2014,
Paternity
Leave,
N.Y.
http://nypost.com/2014/04/23/man-sues-employer-for-alleged-firing-over-paternityleave [https://perma.cc/45LP-6T781; Jennifer O'Neill, Meet the Man Who Sued His
Boss to Spend More Time with His Kids, YAHOO NEWS (Mar. 5, 2015),
https://www.yahoo.com/parenting/meet-the-man-who-sued-his-boss-to-spend-moretime-1 12737108717.html [https://perma.cc/5TS4-JKL4]; TODAY: Male CNN Reporter
Sues Over Parental Leave Policy (NBC television broadcast Nov. 11, 2013),
http://www.today.com/video/today/53520438 [https://perma.cc/T3AC-TSCT].
106.
See, e.g., Andrea Chang, Cheesecake Factory Sued by Workers, L.A.
TIMES (July 11, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/11/business/fi-cheesecake 11
[https://perma.cc/GT4D-CBSC]; Gomstyn, supra note 104; Dave Jamieson,
LensCrafters Settles Female-On-Male Sexual Harassment Case, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 20, 2011, 5:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/20/lenscrafterssettles-fema n 880709.html [https://perma.cc/Q733-2JLV]; Howard Koplowitz, Texas
Man Wins Sexual Harassment Case Against Female Boss: Jury Awards James Gist
$567K in Pam Matranga Case, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014, 10:39 AM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/texas-man-wins-sexual-harassment-case-against-female-bossEve
[https://perma.cc/5G27-7F9A];
jury-awards-james-gist-567k-pam-matranga
Tahmincioglu, Male Sexual HarassmentIs Not a Joke, NBC NEWS (July 10, 2007, 9:49
AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19536167/ns/business-careers/t/male-sexual-
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Because of the availability heuristic,'" media attention has been known
to bias our predictive capacities, " making decisionmakers likely to
perceive men to be significant users of a symmetrical sex discrimination
law.
As for race, a decisionmaker might also perceive whites to use
employment discrimination law based on the perception of the
prevalence of so-called "reverse" race discrimination. White Americans
now view anti-white bias as a more prevalent and a bigger societal
problem than anti-black bias. 1 o Americans overestimate the impact of
affirmative action on historically advantaged groups, supporting a
popular conception that white workers are frequently harmed by such
policies, which give rise to reverse discrimination lawsuits."' This
harassment-not-joke/#.Vcifm2RVikp [https://perma.cc/2DCG-68B8]; Associated Press,
supra note 104; Henry Weinstein & Lisa Girion, Gay Man's Sexual Harassment
Lawsuit Ruled
Worthy
of Trial,
L.A.
TIMES
(Sept.
25,
2002),
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/sep/25/local/me-harass25
[https://perma.cc/XV9J9MMX].
107.
See, e.g., Brittany Bronson, Money, Sex and Las Vegas Pool Parties,
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2015, at SR11 (referring to lawsuits brought by men challenging
female hiring preferences at Las Vegas resorts); Nicole Pasulka, Men Are Suing Ruby
Tuesday Over Sexism, and It May Actually Help Women, YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 23,
2015),
http://news.yahoo.com/men-suing-ruby-tuesday-over-sexism-may-actually004903899.html [https://perma.cc/3K8K-S5L5]; Texas Man Settles Discrimination
Lawsuit Against Hooters for Not Hiring Male Waiters, Fox NEWS (Apr. 21, 2009),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/04/21/texas-man-settles-discrimination-lawsuitagainst-hooters-for-not-hiring-male.html [https://perma.cc/CN7Q-VEFV].
108.
See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 93, at 1477 (explaining that "the
availability heuristic-in which the frequency of some event is estimated by judging
how easy it is to recall other instances of this type . . . -lead[s] us to erroneous
conclusions").
109.
See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HuM. LEARNING & MEMORY 551, 556 (1978) (finding that
eighty percent of subjects estimated death from accident to be more likely than death
from stroke, even though strokes cause eighty-five percent more death than accidents,
and attributing this error in part to media attention); Karyn Riddle, Always on My
Mind: Exploring How Frequent, Recent, and Vivid Television PortrayalsAre Used in
the Formation of Social Reality Judgments, 13 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 155, 155 (2010)
(finding that more frequent viewing of violent media led subjects to give higher
estimates of the prevalence of crime); L.J. Shrum, Media Consumption and Perceptions
of Social Reality: Effects and Underlying Processes, in MEDIA EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN
THEORY AND RESEARCH 69, 72-76 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillman eds., 2002)
(collecting studies finding this effect and explaining it as the impact of media attention
on perceptions of frequency, recency, and vividness).
110.
Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a ZeroSum Game That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. Sci. 215, 215-16 (2011).
111.
See Carol R. Goforth, 'What Is She?' How Race Matters and Why It
Shouldn't, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 75 (1996) (noting that the perception that white males
have been denied equal opportunities "has become a cause celebre"); Brian S. Lowery
et al., Concern for the In-Group and Opposition to Affirmative Action, 90 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961, 966 (2006) (finding that opposition to affirmative
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perception is not limited to formal affirmative action policies, but to
other forms of reverse discrimination as well. 1 12 The perception of these
types of lawsuits is likely to be all the more skewed by the salience of
these issues in the media and the public generally,113 as well as by large
damages awards.'
As for disability, there would be little reason to expect that
decisionmakers would believe that members of the advantaged group
would engage in any significant usage of a symmetrical
antidiscrimination law. Preferences for those with disabilities are still
too rare."' However, if the reasonable accommodation mandate of
disability law were made available to a universal protected class, such
that anybody could seek a needed accommodation, one could expect
such a law to be used widely across the spectrum of employees."'
I have so far relied on the relevant theoretical literature to explore
the impact of a symmetrical or asymmetrical design on the distributive
consequences of antidiscrimination mandates. We can also draw lessons
from empirical research on the consequences of symmetrical and

&

action is driven by desire to avoid harm to whites); S. Pious, Ten Myths About
Affirmative Action, 52 J. Soc. ISSUEs 25, 27 (2003) (listing as commonly believed the
myth that whites are widely adversely affected by affirmative action); Ronald Walters,
Affirmative Action and the Politics of Concept Appropriation, 38 How. L.J. 587, 604
(1995) (noting claims that "some white males suffer a disadvantage from the
implementation of affirmative action laws to such a degree that they have become a new
'oppressed class'").
112.
By the 1990s, more than seventy percent of whites were convinced that
reverse discrimination was a rampant problem, see C.E. "Chuck" Williams, Opinion,
Affirmative Action Doesn't Involve Quotas/Initiative 200-Preference or Prejudice?,
COLUMBIAN, Nov. 1, 1998, at 1I, and by the 2000s, whites viewed racism against
whites as more common and a bigger problem than racism against blacks, see Norton
Sommers, supra note 110, at 216. See generally Anne Laurent, The Great Divide,
Gov'T EXECUTIVE (Apr. 1, 1996), http://www.govexec.com/magazine/1996/04/thegreat-divide/235/ [https://perma.cc/W9RM-2F9W] (discussing the growing perception
among whites that they are wrongfully denied positions or promotions because of their
race).
113.
See RORIE SPILL SOLBERG & ERIC N. WALTENBURG, THE MEDIA, THE
COURT, AND THE MISREPRESENTATION: THE NEW MYTH OF THE COURT 66-68 (2010)
(explaining that one-quarter of news stories on the Supreme Court cover civil rights
cases, and half of these stories are about affirmative action). For example, Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), a race discrimination suit brought by white
employees, garnered substantial media attention. See SOLBERG & WALTENBURG, supra,
at 71.
114.
See, e.g., White Firefighters Awarded $2.5 Million in Discrimination
Case,
NBC
NEWS
(Feb.
9,
2012,
12:44
PM),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/02/09/10362607-white-firefighters-awarded25-million-in-discrimination-case [https://perma.cc/2KU2-YFE4].
115.
For examples, see infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
116.
I discuss this possibility in greater detail when addressing how the
analysis in Part II applies specifically to disability. See infra notes 272-76 and
accompanying text.
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asymmetrical antidiscrimination laws. Although data is limited, it tends
to confirm the conclusions posited above.
Starting with asymmetrical antidiscrimination laws, the ADEA and
the ADA have both been shown to reduce the employment levels of the
groups they protect. As for the ADEA, the law's initial impact may
have been favorable to older workers, primarily because it banned the
then common practice of advertising age limits for jobs, and perhaps
because it helped to change social norms regarding age."' Research on
the later effects of the ADEA paint a far less rosy picture. While the
ADEA may help older workers retain jobs, it has also been linked to a
reduction in their employment levels.' As for the ADA, research has
likewise shown that this law too has hurt the workers it intended to help
by significantly reducing employment levels of disabled workers.119
As for symmetrical antidiscrimination law, since the passage of
Title VII in 1964, women and individuals of color have made great

117.
See Lahey, supra note 72, at 685.
118.
See Michael C. Harper, A Gap in the Agenda: Enhancing the Regulation
of Age Discrimination in Employment, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW INITIATIVES
AND PROPOSALS UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 608-09 (Zev J. Eigen & Samuel
Estreicher eds., 2011); Lahey, supra note 72, at 685. One study found these
employment effects only for men. Id. at 686. This may be because, as Jolls predicted,
occupational segregation may mean that the effect of the mandate on women is on
wages rather than employment levels. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. These
studies did not assess effects on wages.
119.
See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 72, at 915 (finding "a sharp drop in
the employment of disabled workers after the ADA went into effect"); Thomas
DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 35
J. HUM. REsouRcEs 693 (2000) (finding that after the passage of the ADA,
"employment rates of men with disabilities decreased dramatically"); Jolls, supra note
22, at 276; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act
Reduced Employment for People with Disabilities?, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
527, 533-34, 538-39 (2004) (documenting that employment levels of the disabled
"declined dramatically" after the passage of the ADA).
Several scholars have sought to undermine these conclusions by offering an
alternative account of this data. See David H. Autor & Mark G. Duggan, The Rise in
the Disability Rolls and the Decline in Unemployment, 118 Q.J. EcoN. 157 (2003);
Peter Blanck et al., Calibrating the Impact of the ADA's Employment Provisions, 14
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 267 (2003); Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur, Employment of
People with DisabilitiesFollowing the ADA, 42 INDUS. REL. 31 (2003). As disability
law scholar Sam Bagenstos has argued, however, these scholars have either
unjustifiably critiqued the data on which the initial studies relied, Bagenstos, supra note
119, at 540-50, or wrongly placed too much blame on an alternative cause for the
decline, id. at 553-55. Bagenstos instead reads the data as showing that the ADA did
have a negative impact on the employment of those with disabilities, although he limits
the decline to those persons whose disability limits the kind or amount of work they can
do. Id. at 555.
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strides in the workplace. 120 The challenge is assigning the causal
mechanism of this progress, given the increase in human capital by
these groups, as well as changes in societal attitudes towards these
groups.1 2 1 It is possible that Title VII served some countervailing
function in hindering the progress of disadvantaged groups in the
fashion that Jolls' analysis would predict, but that these other changes
overcame this impact. 122 It is thus quite difficult to assess whether Title
VII has had any negative impact on these groups.
Another data point comes from the FMLA, which provides leave
for the birth or care of a newborn symmetrically to men and women.123
The data on the FMLA is mixed, but gives some reason to believe that
the symmetrical design of the FMLA has protected women from the
adverse consequences of a more targeted mandate. 124 The literature
suggests that the FMLA has had a modest positive effect on women's
employment levels. 125 Given occupational segregation, this is not
surprising under Jolls' analysis. 1 26 The question then is whether the
FMLA has had a negative impact on women's wages. One study
showed that women did not suffer any negative impact on wages after
the passage of the FMLA.' 2 ' However, this study suffers from the fact
that many female workers were entitled by state law or firm policy to
FMLA-type benefits prior to the FMLA's passage.1 28 Other research,
though perhaps relevant, is less helpful. A study of the impact of
European leave policies found that short-term (three months) of even
paid leave did not reduce women's wages, 129 but this study lumped
together leave policies that applied only to women and those that
applied to both women and men.' 30 Yet another study found that the
120.
See, e.g., John J. Donohue m & James Heckman, Continuous Versus
Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks,
29 J. EcON. LITERATURE 1603, 1604 (1991).
121.
Id. at 1605-06.
122.
And these potential causes are not independent; there may be interaction
between Title VII and the achievement of human capital as well as changes in societal
attitudes.
123.
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2012).
124.
If the FMLA does not have adverse consequences on women, it will be
hard to disentangle the effect of making child-care leave symmetrical, as compared with
the availability of other forms of leave under the law-such as self-care leave-that men
are more likely to take than child-care leave. See supra note 91.
Lester, supra note 72, at 37-38 (collecting studies).
125.
126.
See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
127.
Jane Waldfogel, The Impact of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 281, 296-99 (1999).
128.
Jolls, supra note 22, at 297.
129.
See Christopher J. Ruhm, The Economic Consequences of ParentalLeave
Mandates:Lessons from Europe, 113 Q.J. EcoN. 285, 287 (1998).
130.
Id. at 286 n.1.
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FMLA had a negative impact on the wages of women who took leave,
but did not assess whether the FMLA affected the wages of women of
child-bearing age more generally."' But we might not be too surprised
with any findings of negative distributive consequences of the FMLA
from studies conducted in the 1990s, when decisionmakers would be
more likely to assume that women would use the law more than men.132
b. Interlocking Stereotypes
Symmetry furthers antisubordination goals by combating harmful
stereotypes that contribute to the subordination of disadvantaged
groups. The stereotypes that apply to a disadvantaged group are often
also manifested-in mirror-image form-in the stereotypes applied to
the advantaged group. Effectively dismantling these stereotypes
requires the ability to challenge them from both sides, which only a
symmetrical law permits.
This phenomenon of interlocking stereotypes is perhaps easiest to
see in the context of sex, where heterosexual marriage means that
stereotypes about women's proper family roles (and workplace
limitations) are often the flip side of the stereotypes about men's proper
family roles (and workplace expectations).13 3 Take the case of a male
police officer who sought leave as a primary caregiver under state
law. 13 4 His employer insisted that "God made women to have babies
and, unless [he] could have a baby, there is no way [he] could be [the]
primary care [giver]" unless his wife was "in a coma or dead." 1 35 This
example, and others like it, 136 demonstrate how sex stereotypes that

131.
Sandra L. Hofferth & Sally C. Curtin, The Impact of ParentalLeave on
MaternalReturn to Work after Childbirth in the United States 14 tbl. 1, 17 tbl.3 (OECD
Soc., Emp't & Migration Working Paper No. 7, 2003). In analyzing these results, one
must be aware of an additional effect of the FMLA: that it may push women into and
keep them in higher-paying jobs. Therefore, a finding of no impact on women's wages
might mask more complex dynamics of at least some women improving their
employment, which counteracts wage discrimination. See Jolls, supra note 22, at 299
(explaining that the FMLA "may have a sort of composite effect, moving women into,
or keeping them, in better, higher-[paying] jobs") (citation omitted).
132.
Even though the FMLA provides for both self-care and family-care leave,
see supra note 91, if decisionmakers assume that self-care leave is taken by equal
numbers of men and women, and that family-care leave is taken by many more women,
then the FMLA would have a negative impact on women. This is especially so because
the family-care provision of the FMLA is likely to be more salient to decisionmakers
than the self-care provision.
133.
See Franklin, supra note 12, at 124, 127-28.
Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001).
134.
Id. 629-30 (internal quotations omitted).
135.
136.
See, e.g., Shafer v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 903 F.2d 243, 244 (3d Cir. 1990)
(male plaintiff challenging policy that limited child-rearing leave to female employees);
Wells v. City of Montgomery, No. 1:04CV425, 2006 WL 1133300, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
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limit women at work are instantiated not only through the stereotyping
of women as mothers first and workers second, but equally through
stereotypes of men as workers first and fathers second. Moreover, these
stereotypes make it harder for men to participate meaningfully in family
life, which in turn contributes to women doing more care work, further
reinforcing sex-role stereotypes and limiting women's workplace
opportunities.137 Precisely because of these interlocking stereotypes,
women's rights advocates, including Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, have
relied on male sex discrimination plaintiffs to combat subordinating
stereotypes against women. 138
Interlocking stereotypes on the basis of sex also arise outside of the
family. In the landmark Price Waterhouse v. Hopkinsl39 case, the
Supreme Court held that denying a woman a professional accounting
partnership because she was too masculine could violate Title VII.'"
The employer criticized the plaintiff because she was "macho"; "a lady
using foul language"; and a "tough-talking somewhat masculine hardnosed [manager]"; and for failing to "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry."' 4 ' As we can see from these criticisms, feminine
and masculine stereotypes are nirror images. Being masculine means
being macho; using foul language, being tough-talking, and being hardnosed, and not walking femininely, not talking femininely, not dressing
femininely, not wearing make-up, not styling one's hair, and not
wearing jewelry. Being feminine means the opposite: being delicate;
not using foul language; not talking tough; and not being hard-nosed;
and walking femininely, talking femininely, dressing femininely,
wearing make-up, styling one's hair, and wearing jewelry. These
stereotypes place women in a double bind in a range of professions that
Apr. 25, 2006) (male plaintiff claiming retaliation for taking leave to care for a child
based on a comment by a superior: "Congratulations for taking the most time off for
having a baby and not actually having the baby.").
For a further discussion of the intersection of family roles and
137.
antidiscrimination law, and especially how antidiscrimination law falls short by failing
to address harms to the family, see Naomi Schoenbaum, The Family and the Market at
Wal-Mart, 62 DEPAUL L. REv. 759, 764-69 (2013).
Professor Cary Franklin has argued that fighting sex-role stereotypes is
138.
precisely why Justice Ginsburg's Women's Rights Project brought so many cases with
male plaintiffs when it was pioneering constitutional sex equality jurisprudence. See
Franklin, supra note 12, at 88, 104-06 (arguing that "Ginsburg pressed the claims of
male plaintiffs" to challenge stereotypes "that reflected or reinforced traditional
conceptions of men's and women's roles"). Likewise, Professor Mary Anne Case has
argued that suits by men challenging sex stereotypes are critical to the equality of
women. See Case, supra note 30, at 3.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
139.
140.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 235 (internal citations omitted).
141.
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require stereotypically masculine traits to get ahead: women must act
aggressively to do the job well, but must act femininely to meet gender
expectations.14 While these stereotypes were manifested against a
woman in Price Waterhouse, they can just as easily arise in cases where
men are penalized for being too feminine.143 Dismantling these
subordinating stereotypes requires a symmetrical law that allows
challenges from both sides."
We can see interlocking stereotypes for other protected traits as
well. Take age, for example. A Department of Labor report that
formed the basis for the passage of the ADEA identified the primary
obstacle that older workers face as one of "stereotyping."45 The
stereotypes that hold older workers back include the view that older
workers are less flexible, more resistant to change, and not as
competent with new or fast-changing technologies.1 " Younger workers
142.
Id. at 251 ("An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but
whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible
catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title
VII lifts women out of this bind."); see also, e.g., Susan T. Fiske et al.,
(Dis)respecting Versus (Dis)liking: Status and Interdependence Predict Ambivalent
Stereotypes of Competence and Warmth, 55 J. Soc. ISSUEs 473, 477-78 (1999);
Madeline E. Heilman & Tyler G. Okimoto, Whry Are Women Penalizedfor Success at
Male Tasks?: The Implied Communality Deficit, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 81, 91 (2007)
(finding that women who succeed at male tasks by adopting masculine traits such as
aggression are penalized because they are viewed as lacking in feminine traits such as
nurturing).
143.
See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568-69 (6th Cir. 2004)
(fire department suspended male firefighter for adopting a feminine appearance);
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (male
waiter harassed for serving "like a woman"); Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery Sch.,
608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1979) (male nursery school teacher fired for "effeminate
appearance"); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir. 1978)
("effeminate" male turned down for mailroom position).
144.
Because of Title VII's symmetry, an effeminate man can argue that he
was discriminated against on the basis of sex because a woman who behaved the same
way would be treated differently. See Case, supra note 30, at 4 (explaining that adding
gender to the list of Title VII's protected traits is not necessary to protect the effeminate
man for this reason). While male plaintiffs have historically faced obstacles in bringing
these claims, id. at 49-51 (collecting cases), such claims are now gaining ground, see,
e.g., City of Salem, 378 F.3d at 572 (male plaintiff can proceed on discrimination claim
based on feminine appearance); Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874-75 (same for harassment
based on femininity).
145.
THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT,
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 2 (1965) (finding that employers make "assumptions
about the effect of age on [an individual's] ability to do a job when there is in fact no
basis for [such] assumptions") (emphasis omitted).
146.
See Scott J. Adams & David Neumark, Age Discriminationin US Labor
Markets: A Review of the Evidence, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICs OF
DISCRIMINATION 187, 190 (William M. Rodgers III ed., 2006); HRM, Age
Discrimination Against Younger Workers, HC ONuNE (Jan. 9, 2013),
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workers is that they are the opposite: uncool and behind-the-times.

'

face the flip side of these stereotypes. If older workers are viewed as
too slow and stuck in the past, younger workers are viewed as too
quick and not stuck enough: great with new technology, but less
committed, less reliable, and less talented with traditional skills like inperson interviewing and writing. 14 7 Again, a symmetrical law that
allows these stereotypes to be challenged from both sides will be far
more effective at rooting them out.
Interlocking stereotypes are present for other protected identity
traits like race and national origin, albeit less pervasively. The weaker
presence of interlocking stereotypes in these contexts may be due to the
difference between binary traits, on the one hand, and discrete traits on
the other. For binary traits, it is easy to view one group as the opposite
of, or "not" the other. This is so for sex, and while age is a continuous
trait, it may be perceived as binary (old and young). In the context of
discrete traits, by contrast, there are multiple different groups that fall
within the protected identity trait, and so no group serves as the foil for
the other group. Nonetheless, interlocking stereotypes do exist in this
context as well.
For example, one common stereotype of black workers is that they
are cool, stylish, and hip, whereas a common stereotype of white

http://www.hcamag.com/hr-news/age-discrimination-against-younger-workers147776.aspx [https://perma.cc/B9PZ-KNUJ] (citing a survey of hiring managers
finding that they believe older workers need to improve their technological skills); see
also, e.g., Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 802 (6th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the belief
that "older workers are more resistant to change and are adverse to learning new
methods . . . is the very type of ageist stereotype that the ADEA was enacted to
address"); Peterson v. Mid-State Grp., 54 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1044 (E.D. Wis. 2014)
(allowing an ADEA plaintiff to survive summary judgment because employer's
professed nondiscriminatory reasons for termination-that employee was unable to
adapt to the computer system and was resistant to change-were consistent with ageist
stereotypes).
147.
See Armour, supra note 101 (discussing stereotype of younger workers as
"slackers who tend to be less loyal to the company"); HRM, supra note 146 (citing
survey of hiring managers finding that younger workers are viewed as less reliable and
less professional); see also, e.g., Nishi v. Siemens AG, 290 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 (E.D.
Mich. 2003) (reverse age discrimination claim based on maturity concerns); Bergen
Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 947 (N.J. 1999) (same).
148.
Compare ANTHONY J. CORTESE, PROVOCATEUR 117 (3d ed. 2008) (noting
that "[b]lack people have traditionally set trends in fashion style, language, and
particularly, entertainment" and that "[b]lack images are often used ...
to impart what
is considered 'cool,' stylish, [or] 'hip'"), with Lori Kendall, "White and Nerdy":

Computers, Race, and the Nerd Stereotype, 44 J.

POPULAR CULTURE

505 (2011)

(explaining how whiteness has been linked with nerdiness and uncoolness) (internal
citation omitted). Interlocking racial stereotypes also arise in athletics. See Jeff Ston et
al., "White Men Can't Jump": Evidence for Perceptual Confirmation of Racial
Stereotypes Following a Basketball Game, 19 BASIC & APPuED Soc. PSYCHOL. 291
(1997) (finding that subjects stereotyped black basketball players as more athletic and
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Even this seemingly benign stereotype of black workers is
subordinating because it may limit employers' conceptions of the types
of jobs that are a good match for black workers. For example, a
successful black advertising executive may be poised for a promotion to
be the first black vice president at his firm, only to learn that he is to
head up the new "urban" division at the company.1 49 If white workers
denied positions in the "urban" division are not allowed to challenge
these decisions, the interlocking racial stereotypes that confine black
workers to narrower paths for success are fought less effectively, from
only one side.
c. Heterogeneity of Disadvantage
This next argument varies from the last two in that the
antisubordination purpose that is achieved is not in the form of benefits
to a historically subordinated group, but in recognizing the variety of
manifestations that disadvantage can take. The antisubordination view
relies on a clean division between the advantaged group and the
disadvantaged group.' The early scholarship developing the theory
was focused on governmental policies related to race, and it seemed
straightforward that blacks were disadvantaged and whites were
advantaged. 1 ' But in the employment context, stereotypes of even
subordinated groups may systematically work to their advantage in
pockets of the labor market. Moreover, the circumstances of
naturally talented and white players as more intelligent and hustling more); see also,
e.g., Heike v. Guevara, 519 F. App'x 911, 919 (6th Cir. 2013) (white athlete claiming
race discrimination based on basketball coach's preference for "thug" or "ghetto"
players).
Interlocking stereotypes have also been identified in Native American and white
identities. Whites have long been stereotyped as embracing modem civilization,
whereas Native Americans face both an idealized stereotype of avoiding the evils of this
civilization, as well as a "negative stereotype of Indians [as] the dupes of missionaries,
the drunk 'hang around the fort' Indians." Tod D. Swanson, Through Family Eyes:
Towards a More Adequate Perspectivefor Viewing Native American Religious Life, 21
AM. INDIAN Q. 57, 57-58 (1997). These "mirror image stereotypes" of whites and
Native Americans "feed off each other," and "work[] together [to] create a destructive
system of meaning." Id. at 58, 64.
149.
I draw this example from the television show Black-ish. See Black-ish:
Pilot (ABC television broadcast Sept. 24, 2104); ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A
PRIVILEGED CLASS 80 (1993) (describing how many black executives are steered into
"black" jobs in areas such as "community relations" or "minority affairs"); see
generally

JOHN D. SKRENTNY, AFrER CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEW
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 11-12 (2014) (discussing employer's reliance on "racial

abilities"-"perceptions that employees of some races are better able to perform some
tasks than employees of other races due to their aptitude or knowhow").
150.
See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
151.
See generally Fiss, supra note 17 (relying on state action based on race to
develop seminal antisubordination theory).
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subordinated groups and the labor market have changed substantially
since the antisubordination theory was developed, calling into question
the neat division of advantaged and disadvantaged groups.
For some traits, there are reasons to believe that both "sides" of a
protected trait face substantial systematic subordination, but in different
ways. The prime example is age. Even the legislative history of the
ADEA acknowledges that younger workers may be at a disadvantage to
older workers in some circumstances: while older applicants were
treated with disdain, older workers were "frequently preferred over the
younger" workers when it came to promotions and treatment within the
workplace.152 Younger workers have only fared worse since then, even
as applicants. Despite the fact that one of the primary concerns of the
ADEA was high levels of unemployment among older workers, 153
workers between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four now have a
higher unemployment rate (4.9%) than workers fifty-five years and
older (3.5 %).154 Older workers also out-earn younger workers. 55
And while the ADEA focused on the negative stereotypes that
older workers face,156 younger workers too face negative stereotypes
that arguably hold them back just as much. When it comes to skills,
younger workers may be viewed as less competent.15' As for personal
152.
Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788
Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 90th Cong.
1, 85 (1967) (statement of William D. Bechill, Comm'r on Aging).
153.
See Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination
Really Age Discrimination?The ADEA's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 780,
783-84 (1997) (explaining that the ADEA was motivated by the problem of long-term
unemployment among the elderly and legislative findings that "the burden of
unemployment was falling disproportionately on older workers").
154.
Labor Force Statistics from the CurrentPopulation Survey, BUREAu LAB.
STATS., https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpseealO.htm [https://perma.cc/J8ZP-TCTD]
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
155.
See Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1813, 1815 (1996). In light of rising wages for older
workers, Christine Jolls has argued that the primary purpose of the ADEA may not be
civil rights but employer hands-tying. Under this view of the ADEA, what underlies the
law is a bargain between employers and employees, premised on an unstated agreement
of rising wages over the course of an employee's career with the firm. This rising wage
is less than the employee's productivity early on, but more than productivity later in the
career. Without protection against termination at the later stage, however, employers
would be free to breach the bargain by terminating employees when wages exceed
productivity. Under the hands-tying view, the ADEA prevents this. While this may or
may not explain current law, compare id. at 1814-15, with Issacharoff & Harris, supra
note 153, at 800 (finding this an unsatisfying justification for the ADEA), it is
orthogonal to an analysis of how an age discrimination law aimed at promoting
antisubordination purposes should be designed.
156.
See supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text.
157.
See HRM, supra note 146 (noting in particular writing ability); Snowdon,
supra note 99; Emily Weller, DiscriminationAgainst Young Workers in the Workplace,
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characteristics, younger workers are thought to be less reliable, less
professional, and less committed to the job,' as well as less affable,
with lower moral standards.' The stereotype of the irresponsible
younger worker is only magnified with young adults' delayed
independence from their families of origin well into adulthood.'" These
stereotypes are particularly problematic in positions seen to require
authority.' 61
Younger workers feel the impact of these stereotypes. According
to one recent study, people in their forties were viewed as having the
highest status in the workplace, while those over seventy were given a
higher status than those in their twenties.162 Younger workers are more
likely than older workers to report experiencing age-related prejudice,
with those under twenty-five at least twice as likely to have experienced
it as other age groups.163 Just forty-four percent of employees ages
eighteen to twenty-four believe they are treated fairly on the job,
compared with sixty-four percent of employees ages forty-five to fiftyfive.'" In circumstances like these, when different "sides" of the trait
face different forms of systematic disadvantage, it is especially
troubling to wall off a group's ability to challenge discrimination.
Like age, the neat division of subordination by sex, with men at
the top and women at the bottom, has become more muddied in recent
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/discrimination-against-young-workersworkplace-46927.html [https://perma.cc/CRD6-A76Z] (last visited Feb. 25, 2017)
(noting that younger workers are perceived as less competent and more demanding,
especially of flexible schedules and time off, and less in need of an income compared
with older workers supporting families). Note that age-based competency stereotypes
may vary based on the type of job. See Adams & Neumark, supra note 146, at 190
(reviewing study finding preference for older worker for stamp and coin salesperson
and younger worker for CD salesperson).
158.
See Armour, supra note 101; HRM, supra note 146; Scott Wooldridge,
Millennials: The New Victims of Age Discrimination?, BENEFITSPRO (Sept. 30, 2015),
http://www.benefitspro.com/2015/09/30/millennials-the-new-victims-of-agediscrimination [https://perma.cc/3TZ5-6KJ5] (noting that employers often view
younger workers as "lazy, unpredictable, unreliable, unprofessional, and not willing to
follow the rules of workplace conduct," and are concerned that younger workers
"simply won't stick with a job once hired").
159.
See Snowdon, supra note 99.
160.
See Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of
Development from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469
(2000).
161.
See, e.g., Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999)
(twenty-five-year-old bank vice president demoted after employer learned of his age).
In an anecdote reported by Armour, supra note 101, when a twenty-nine-year-old
lawyer stood to argue his case, the judge joked, "Is it bring-your-kids-to-work day?,"
and asked if his dad would be arguing the motion.
162.
See Snowdon, supra note 99.
163.
See id. (reporting on results of a 2012 survey).
164.
Armour, supra note 101 (reporting on results of a 2002 survey).
CHRON,
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years.165 Men now attend college at lower rates than women,166 and
skills associated with traditional male jobs are not as valued in the
current economy.167 This does not mean that men in general are moving
towards taking on the subordinated position in the labor market, but
that a bimodal distribution of male workers may be emerging. Men
have remained stably privileged at the highest levels of the labor
market, in top management and professional jobs, but are also
overrepresented at the bottom of the labor market, leaving them less
represented in the middle."' While this trend is still emerging, the
trajectory should lead us to question our confidence in rigid
demarcations of subordination by sex in the labor market, as well as
any law that would recognize disadvantage only of women workers.

&

165.
See generally LIZA MUNDY, THE RICHER SEX (2012) (discussing how soon
more households will be supported by women than men and the consequences); HANNA
RosIN, THE END OF MEN (2012) (chronicling how women are surpassing men in a
number of domains, including many measures of education and labor market
achievement). Rosin's work has generated criticism for missing key ways in which men
remain privileged in the labor market, see, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The
End of Men or the Rebirth of Class, 93 B.U. L. REv. 871, 871-73 (2013); Michael
Selmi & Sonia Weil, Can All Women Be Pharmacists?:A Critique of Hanna Rosin's
The End Of Men, 93 B.U. L. REv. 851, 852 (2013), but these criticisms do not alter the
fundamental shifts in the labor market that Rosin does chronicle.
166.
See ROsIN, supra note 165, at 4 ("In the United States, for every two men
who will receive a BA this year, for example, three women will do the same."); Gary
S. Becker et al., Explaining the Worldwide Boom in Higher Education of Women, 4 J.
HUM. CAP. 203 (2010) (documenting and explaining this phenomenon).
See ROsIN, supra note 165, at 4-5 ("Of the fifteen job categories
167.
projected to grow the most in the United States over the next decade, twelve are
occupied primarily by women."). The decline of men in the labor force is explained by
"sweeping structural changes in rich economies [that] have reduced the demand for all
less-skilled workers." Decline of the Working Man, EcONOMIsT (Apr. 28, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/18618613
[https://perma.cc/B6Y7-VEAJ].
"Men
have been hit harder than women by these shifts [because] . . . [t]hey are likelier to
work in manufacturing," whereas "women have been better represented in sectors,
such as health care and education, where most job growth has taken place." Id.; see
also ROsIN, supra note 165, at 5 ("In the past, men derived their advantage largely
from size and strength, but the postindustrial economy is indifferent to brawn [as a]
service and information economy rewards precisely the opposite qualities-the ones that
can't be easily replaced by a machine."). For a discussion of how technological change
has enhanced sex equality in one profession-pharmacy, see Claudia Goldin
Lawrence F. Katz, A Most EgalitarianProfession: Pharmacy and the Evolution of a
Family-FriendlyOccupation, 34 J. LAB. EcON. 705 (2016).
See Roy F. BAUMEISTER, Is THERE ANYTHING GOOD ABoUT MEN? 16-18
168.
(2010) (arguing that male distribution across many measures is bimodal: that men
occupy both the top and bottom levels of achievement); Stephanie Coontz, The Myth of
Male
Decline,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
30,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/opinion/sunday/the-myth-of-male-decline.html
[https://perma.cc/767N-ED5C] (critiquing RosIN, supra note 165, and Mundy, supra
note 165, for failing to disaggregate the top of the labor market, where men continue to
surpass women).
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Occupational segregation by race and sex also challenges the neat
division of subordinated groups. 16 While the bulk of this segregation
operates to maintain traditional identity-based hierarchies,' this is not
always the case. Occupational segregation can also lead an advantaged
group to be systematically excluded from desirable occupations. Only a
symmetrical law allows this type of disadvantage to be challenged.
When it comes to occupational segregation by sex, there are
numerous desirable occupations that are dominated by women. Table 2
below provides examples of female-dominated occupations where the
median weekly earnings for men in these occupations substantially
exceed the national average of median weekly earnings for men, which
was $841 in 2014.1" Of course, earnings are not the only relevant
factor for making an occupation desirable (I return to this point below),
but earnings provide a simple measure to demonstrate that there are
occupations that men might desire to enter that are harder for them to
enter than women.
TABLE 2172

Occupation

Dental Hygienist
Nurse Practitioner
Registered Nurse
Occupational Therapist
Social Worker
Elementary and Middle School Teachers

Percent Median
Female Weekly Male
Earnings"
$1034*
97%
92%
$1753*
89%
$1261
$1365*
86%
81%
$1039
$1126
79%

169.
See Olga Alonso-Villar et al., The Extent of Occupational Segregation in
the United States: Diferences by Race, Ethnicity, and Gender, 51 INDus. REL. 179,
187-92 (2012) (documenting significant amount of segregation).
Id. at 181 (noting that jobs dominated by women and minorities pay less);
170.
see also Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An
Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job
Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1073, 1074-75 (1992) ("Job segregation is not a
separate-but-equal arrangement; minorities and women are concentrated in work
offering lower wages, less status, and fewer opportunities for advancement.").
171.
Household Data Annual Averages, BUREAU
LAB.
STATS.,
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat39.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SD8-EPBQ] (last visited Mar.
9, 2017).
172.
All data is from 2016 and derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Id.
173.
This measure disaggregates the median weekly earnings of men in these
occupations as compared with women in these occupations because men earn
substantially more. The figures in this column with asterisks represent median weekly
earnings for men and women combined, because figures for men alone are unavailable.
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One might quibble with my conclusion that men in these desirable
female occupations are disadvantaged relative to women. First, most of
these occupations require an advanced degree, and men with the same
level of education could earn more in another (male-dominated)
occupation. While men (and women) with the same level of education
could earn more in other jobs, even an antisubordination absolutist
would likely measure disadvantage not only in earnings potential, but in
life opportunities. Even if a man could get a master's degree in
information technology and earn more than if he had pursued a master's
degree in nursing, this does not negate the fact that some men might
prefer nursing to information technology. If men as a group
systematically face obstacles to entering nursing, they should be
regarded as disadvantaged with regard to this occupation.
Second, men earn more than women in these occupations, and thus
they appear to be advantaged in these jobs. Much of the earnings gap in
any occupation is attributable to the fact that men work more hours and
enjoy fewer interruptions in their careers.174 Even if men in these
professions earn more, this does not negate the existence of systematic
barriers to men entering and remaining in these professions."' And,

174.
See Paula England, Gender Inequality in Labor Markets: The Role of
Motherhood and Segregation, 12 Soc. POL. 264, 270-72 (2005).
175.
Much of the research comes from the field of nursing. See Christiana
Kouta & Charis P. Kaite, Gender Discriminationand Nursing: A Literature Review, 27
J. PROF. NURSING 59, 59-60 (2011) (cataloguing stereotyping of men in nursing and its
consequences, including that male nurses are held back because of inequitable treatment
in nursing school, as well as workplace stereotypes, such as that men are "considered
to lack the capacity to provide mothering and caring," and reporting that "men resign
from nursing during the first [four] years after graduation more frequently than
women"); see also, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982)
(holding that denying males the right to enroll in the state nursing school violates equal
protection); Evans v. Prinicipi, No. Civ.A. 02-2258(GK), 2005 WL 485743, at *1
(D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2005) (male nurse suing for sex discrimination alleging that his
supervisor told him that he "d[id]n't belong here" and that he was treated far worse
than his female colleagues). Another example comes from the obstetrics and
gynecology field, which has become so female-dominated that it is now difficult for
men to enter the field. See Tamar Lewin, Women's Health is No Longer a Man's
World, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/07/us/women-shealth-is-no-longer-a-man-s-world.html
[https://perma.cc/8KGS-9Z25]
(quoting
chairman of the Council on Resident Education in Obstetrics and Gynecology that this
is "a huge issue for male medical students"); see also, e.g., Veleanu v. Beth Isr. Med.
Ctr., No. 98 CIV. 7455(VM), 2000 WL 1400965, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000)
(male gynecologist claiming that employer sought to create an all-female staff). And we
can see additional examples in other caring professions. See, e.g., Scott v. Parkview
Mem'l Hosp., 175 F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 1999) (male social worker claiming that
employer favored women by using sex as proxy for caring attitude); Longariello v. Sch.
Bd. of Monroe Cty., 161 F.3d 21 (11th Cir. 1998) (male teacher claiming failure to
hire); Keller v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 639 F. Supp. 2d 928, 937 (S.D. Ind.
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importantly, the disadvantage that men face in these occupations is
linked to the ongoing subordination of women: until it is accepted for
men to engage in traditionally feminine jobs, these jobs will continue to
confer less status and lower pay, which primarily harms women."'
This pattern of occupational segregation holds less true for other
traits. While there is occupational segregation by race, it is less
pronounced."' And race-based occupational segregation should be
distinguished from sex-based occupational segregation on two grounds.
First, because these are workers from minority races and national
origins, even when they are disproportionately represented in an
occupation, they continue to make up a minority of that occupation, as
compared to the ninety percent or greater saturation of women in the
most sex-segregated occupations. 1 8 This means that the degree of
exclusion of men in sex-segregated fields is less likely to occur for
whites in race-segregated fields. Second, there are fewer occupations
that disproportionately employ racial and ethnic minorities that would
be deemed desirable by the wage measure relied on above.
One exception is for Asian workers, who are disproportionately
represented in a number of desirable occupations, including a variety of
technology, mathematical, engineering, and science occupations.' 79 My

2009) (male employees of mental health facility claiming more favorable treatment of
female employees).
176.
See Case, supra note 30, at 34 (describing how the devaluation of the
feminine, in women or men, will accrue to the disadvantage of women).
177.
See Alonso-Villar et al., supra note 169, at 188.
178.
HouseholdData Annual Averages, supra note 171.
179.
See id. (listing, inter alia, statistician, computer systems analyst, medical
scientist, physical scientist, physicians, and pharmacists); Jay McGregor, 2% of Google
Employees are Black and Just 30% are Women, FoRBES (May 29, 2014, 10:01 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jaymcgregor/2014/05/29/2-of-google-employees-areblack-and-just-30-are-women
[https://perma.cc/G5PJ-VN9Z]
(citing
Google's
workforce as 30% Asian). Notably, Asian workers' median weekly earnings are
actually higher than white workers' earnings. Press Release, Bureau of Lab. Stats.,
Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers Second Quarter 2015 (July 21,
2015),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/wkyeng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DUQ86PXA] ($965 per week for Asians as compared with $829 for whites). While Asian
workers as a whole out-earn white workers, the distribution of earnings across Asian
workers varies, with some subgroups of Asians earning more than whites, and others
earning less. See Alonso-Villar et al., supra note 169, at 192, 203. Thus, the relative
privilege of Asian workers and white workers must be viewed more granularly. And
given the numerical supremacy of whites in the workforce, it is still hard to argue that
as a general matter, whites are subordinated as compared with even the privileged
subset of Asian Americans. Recent lawsuits against elite universities challenging
affirmative action policies as unduly limiting Asian as compared with white acceptance
rates demonstrate how Asians may continue to be subordinated, even as model
minorities. See, e.g., Harvard's Asian Problem: A Lawsuit Says Racial Preferences
Hurt High-Achieving Minorities, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/harvards-
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aim is not to suggest that Asian Americans do not face harmful
stereotyping or discrimination that limits their employment
opportunities, so but rather to highlight that whites may not be the most
privileged race across all occupations."' Only a symmetrically designed
law allows disadvantage to be challenged in its varied manifestations.
B. Practice

"

The symmetrical or asymmetrical design of an employment
discrimination law matters not only for the purpose of the law, but also
for how the law is implemented in practice. Here too there are benefits
to symmetry. An asymmetrical law requires a defined protected class.
By putting courts in the position of iteratively deciding who is in and
who is out of the class, such a requirement runs counter to
anticlassification purposes and stands at odds with a more fluid notion
of identity that is pressed by transgender and other plaintiffs. Requiring
a protected-class determination at the outset of the case unduly restricts
understandings of discrimination and plaintiffs' ability to prove their
claims. These practical shortcomings of asymmetry are discussed in
turn.
With a symmetrical law, there need be no analysis of whether the
plaintiff is a member of a protected class. As one court explained in a
Title VII case: "By virtue of being a human being, the Plaintiff satisfies
the first element-he belongs to a race and national origin: white,
Hispanic." 1 82 By contrast, asymmetrical laws define a protected class.183
Courts must then determine at the outset of each lawsuit whether the
plaintiff is a member of the protected class. Under the ADEA, the
analysis is quite simple, as age is an easily quantifiable trait.
asian-problem-1416615041 [https://perma.cc/LLL6-MMCG] (last updated Nov. 21,
2014, 7:19 PM).
180.
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 1259, 1268-69 (2000) (discussing how a male Korean American
might be stereotyped as being "good at math and science, unassertive, quiet,
hardworking, uncreative, and impersonal").
See, e.g., Heldt v. Tata Consultancy Servs. Ltd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1185
181.
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (white plaintiffs alleging discrimination in favor of Asians in
technology positions); Koehler v. Infosys Techs. Ltd., 107 F. Supp. 3d 940 (E.D. Wis.
2015) (same).
182.
Padilla v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., No. 06-CIV-60934, 2007 WL
2364332, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2007),
For continuous traits, this is less of a requirement than a sense that an
183.
asymmetrical law that is meant to protect the subordinated group would limit the
protected class to those within this group. See supra note 46 and accompanying text
(discussing how ADEA limits the protected class to those over forty).
184.
See Peter H. Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age
DiscriminationAct of 1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27, 32 n.22 (1979) ("An age criterion is
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However, race, national origin, sex, and disability can require a more
complicated analysis, which might be particularly troubling in the era
of Caitlyn Jenner and Rachel Dolezal, when the line between male and
female and black and white is increasingly blurred.' And because
there is no natural or accepted definition of disability, this initial
classification decision has come to define the field of disability
discrimination litigation.'
The need for courts to make protected-class determinations at the
outset of litigation is troubling.
For those who believe
antidiscrimination law's purpose is to limit classifications on the basis
of protected identity traits, an antidiscrimination law that required these
types of classifications would be in stark tension with this goal.' Such
classifications recall a disturbing history of race and other identity
classifications that have been used to exclude and demean."8 The
volume of employment discrimination cases, and thus the volume of
classifications, only further underscores this concern.'
Beyond classification concerns, a protected-class requirement will
unduly restrict which theories of discrimination courts cognize and
which plaintiffs can proceed on their claims by adding yet one more test
to an area of law already littered with formal tests.' Scholars have
explored how these rigid tests have served as roadblocks to new
theories of discrimination and to plaintiffs' ability to establish their
claims.' 91 As Professor Sandra Sperino has argued, employment
discrimination tests, including the protected-class test, have led courts
perhaps the classic example of the 'formally realizable rule'-a criterion of decision
whose applicability is readily ascertainable by the investigation of relatively
unambiguous, objective facts.").
185.
See Elinor Burkett, Opinion, What Makes a Woman, N.Y. TIMEs, June 7,
2015, at SRI; Charles M. Blow, The Delusions of Rachel Dolezal, N.Y. TIMES (June
17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/opinion/charles-blow-the-delusions-ofdolezal.html [https://perma.cc/65N6-DT9G].
186.
See Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 398-99 (noting that this inquiry has
become the central issue under the ADA).
187.
See supra Part II.A.1.
188.
See Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DuKE L.J.
1487, 1505 (2000) (explaining how the one-drop rule-that "any person with even a
drop of Black blood would have the same legal status as a pure African"-was used to
enforce segregation); see also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (in a case
authorizing sterilization of disabled women, noting that "[t]hree generations of
imbeciles are enough").
189.
See Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 5.
190.
See generally Jessica Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 101 (2017) (discussing how courts weed out employment discrimination claims by
assessing whether the plaintiff is a member of the protected class).
191.
See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discriminationby Comparison, 120 YALE L.J.
728 (2011); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking DiscriminationLaw, 110 MICH. L. REv. 69

(2011).
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to focus too much on the tests and to "dismiss claims . .. that do not fit

neatly within recognized structures."' Plaintiffs' claims have been
dismissed, despite substantial evidence of discrimination, simply
because they did not meet the technical bounds of the prima facie
case.1 93

While at first blush these concerns might sound in the canonical
rules-standards debate,'" there are reasons to be particularly concerned
about the unduly rigid application of rules here. It is notoriously
difficult to gain traction on the central question in disparate treatment
claims: whether the employer engaged in conduct because of a
protected trait, which I refer to as the causation inquiry. In the face of
this difficulty, judges decide an enormous volume of discrimination
cases under a starting assumption that not much discrimination actually
occurs in the world.' 95 In light of these circumstances, scholars have
shown how courts police the boundaries of employment discrimination
claims by applying overly strict tests that allow them to avoid the
troubling causation question."*
Of particular relevance here, we can see the restrictive application
of the protected-class test under the ADA. Determining whether a
plaintiff is an individual with a "disability" "has become the most

192.
Sperino, supra note 191, at 71.
193.
See id. at 88-91; see, e.g., Harmon v. EarthgrainsBaking Cos., No. 085227, 2009 WL 332705, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009) (rejecting an ADEA
termination claim despite employer comment that "older people are . . . not your best
people" because the plaintiff could not show that he had been replaced by a younger
worker because his position was eliminated). Professor Suzanne Goldberg raises similar
objections to the use of a strict comparator test as part of the plaintiff's prima facie
case. See Goldberg, supra note 191, at 747 n.48 (describing how "plaintiff must show
that 'he was treated less favorably . . . than were other similarly situated employees
who were not members of the protected class'"). She argues that this test has "sharply
narrow[edl . . . the possibility of success for individual litigants," by "miss[ing]
important forms of discrimination and foreclos[ing] many individuals from having even
an opportunity to be heard . . . ." Id. at 734-35.
194.
See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 383-90
(1985), for a recitation of the debate.
195.
See Katie R. Eyer, That's Not Discrimination:American Beliefs and the
Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REv. 1275, 1278 (2012) (collecting
studies showing that "most people, in most factual circumstances, are unwilling to
make robust attributions to discrimination").
196.
See Goldberg, supra note 191, at 790 (explaining that courts' insistence
on the comparator test "provide[s] false certainty to the extent that [it is] treated as
elemental to, or objectively confirmatory of, discrimination [and that] this false
certainty enables courts to elide accountability" for failing to consider other ways of
proving discrimination); Sperino, supra note 191, at 71 (explaining that reliance on
rigid tests has led to a false certainty as to the dispositive nature of such tests, such that
courts "reject new theories of discrimination, without actually analyzing whether such
theories are viable").
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contentious issue in the administration of the statute."1 97 Many scholars
agree that "courts have inappropriately applied a restrictive definition
of 'disability' to squelch ADA cases at the summary judgment
stage."19'

Even when genuine issues of material fact regarding a

plaintiff's disability status arise, courts have kicked out such cases on
summary judgment at high rates.'" And even when the statute itself has

taken a more expansive approach to the definition of disability,
specifically instructing that individuals who are "regarded as" disabled
should be covered, courts still take a quite restrictive approach to the

definition of the protected class.2 All told, this means that a substantial
portion of ADA lawsuits are lost at the protected-class stage. 20 ' While
amendments to the ADA were aimed at easing these difficulties,
scholars are not optimistic that they will achieve this goal.2

Eliminating protected-class determinations shifts the key inquiry in
a discrimination case to causation, where it is better placed.203 Consider
sex discrimination claims raised by transgender individuals. In such

cases, courts have to assess the threshold question of whether
discrimination because of transgenderism is discrimination because of
sex.2 " Some courts, as well as the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), have answered this question in the affirmative.205
But the symmetry of Title VH provides a substantial benefit in such

&

197.
Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 398-99; see also Peter David Blanck
Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment Provisions of the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 42 VILL. L. REv. 345, 352 (1997) ("One of the most
contentious aspects of disability law, research and policy involves the definition of
disability."); Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
621, 623 (1999) (reporting estimate that disability status is challenged in more than half
of ADA cases); Mayerson, supra note 53, at 587 ("[N]o issue has generated more
controversy and divergence in judicial interpretation than the definition of disability ...
198.
Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 399; see, e.g., Burgdorf, supra note 53, at
536; Ruth Colker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 99-100 (1999).
199.
Colker, supra note 198, at 110-19.
200.
Mayerson, supra note 53, at 590-91.
201.
See Barbara A. Lee, A Decade of the Americans with Disabilities Act:
Judicial Outcomes and Unresolved Problems, 42 IND. REL. 11, 11 (2003).
202.
See, e.g., Befort, supra note 53, at 2063-66; Stein et al., supra note 12,
at 721-27.
203.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (making discrimination unlawful
when it is "because of" a protected trait).
204.
See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
See id. Under a strategic enforcement plan adopted in 2012, the EEOC
205.
has taken the position that discrimination on the basis of transgender identity is sex
discrimination. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, EEOC v. Deluxe Fin. Servs. Inc., 2015 WL
3636151 (D. Minn. June 4, 2015) (No. 0:15-cv-02646-ADM-SER); Complaint at 1,
EEOC v. Lakeland Eye Clinic, P.A., 2014 WL 4784114 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2014)
(No. 8:14-cv-2421-T35-AEP).
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cases: courts do not also need to assess whether the plaintiff is a man or
a woman to determine whether she is a member of the protected class.
This avoided question is one that not only would be quite difficult to
answer, but would present a troubling irony for female-to-male
transgender individuals: if the plaintiffs desired gender identity were
accepted, he would be outside the protection of an asymmetrical sex
discrimination law.
We can also see the benefits of avoiding the protected-class inquiry
in the context of race. Consider what Professor Camille Gear Rich has
referred to as "elective race"-the recognition that, in addition to racial
ascription by others, individuals engage in "voluntary acts . . . [of]
'race and ethnic performance' . . . [that] are equally, if not more,

determinative of how an individual is racially categorized by others."2 06
When an individual's elected race does not comport with her perceived
race, courts must decide whether to consider the employee's elected or
perceived race in assessing claims of discrimination.20 7
Under a symmetrically designed law, this question is treated as a
question of causation rather than as part of the protected-class
inquiry.208 This is a distinction with a difference. The protected-class
approach tends to treat identity as a static concept that inheres in an
individual. Scholars have questioned this understanding of identity, and
instead recognize that identity is more of a process of social
construction and ascription. They argue that "society places people into
categories with attendant ascribed attributes that effectively constitute a
social identity."2 " This means that a trait like race or national origin is
not simply a biological category, but one "constructed along cultural,
206.
Camille Gear Rich, Elective Race: Recognizing Race Discriminationin
the Era of Racial Self-Identification, 102 GEO. L.J. 1501, 1513 (2014).
207.
See Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., No. 3:08-CV-00375-LRHRAM, 2010 WL 653764, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2010) (in a case alleging harassment
on the basis of perceived Native American race, assessing whether the plaintiff could
proceed on this theory even though he had elected to identify himself as Hispanic to his
employer); Rich, supra note 206, at 1505-07.
208.
When courts have treated this as part of the prima facie case, plaintiffs
have lost. See Nieves v. Metro. Dade Cty., 598 F. Supp. 955, 962 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (in
the case of a racially ambiguous plaintiff claiming discrimination on the basis of
perceived Hispanic race, dismissing case because plaintiff had failed to establish that he
was in fact Hispanic).
209.
Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On
Being "Regarded As" Black, and Why Title WI Should Apply Even If Lakisha and
Jamal Are White, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 1283, 1288 n.23 (summarizing ERVING GOFFMAN,
STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963)); see also Camille

Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the
Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1134, 1158-66 (2004); Ian F. Haney Lopez,
The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and
Choice, 29 HAPv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 27 (1994); see generally ERVING GOFFMAN,
STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963).
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political, and economic lines."210 The process of social identity
ascription also includes how others react to an individual's own
identity-related choices and behaviors.2 1 ' Given the fluid nature of
identity, properly understanding identity requires a more flexible
approach that recognizes that identity may shift depending on context.
Assessing these questions as a matter of causation rather than protected
class provides this flexibility by focusing more on employer conduct
rather than on any fixed quality of the employee.
We can see this in the context of racial classifications, where
courts have tended to show more flexible conceptions of racial identity
when they are addressed as a matter of causation rather than as a matter
of protected class. In Wood v. Freeman Decorating Services,2 12 the
plaintiff claimed that he was harassed on the basis of Native American
race.213 The defendant objected on the ground that the plaintiff "(1) has
no evidence establishing himself as American Indian and (2) has
previously identified himself as Hispanic rather than American
Indian." 214 The court, addressing this as a question of causationwhether the plaintiff was subject to harassing conduct "because of [his]
race [or national origin]"-rather than membership in a protected class,
focused on the employer's ascription of the plaintiff's race, rather than
on any inherent notion of plaintiffs identity. 215 The court paid little
heed to the plaintiff's birth certificate classifying him as white, or to the
plaintiff's previous reporting of his race as Hispanic in employment
records.2 1 6 instead, the court focused on the fact that the "Defendant's
employees believed that Plaintiff was American Indian." 2 17 The court
reasoned that harassment on the basis of perceived race does not alter
the fact that this is harassment on the basis of race, nor lessen the
resulting injury to the plaintiff. 218
In Nieves v. Metropolitan Dade County,219 by contrast, the
restrictive results of a protected-class approach can be seen. 220 The
plaintiff claimed discrimination on the basis of Hispanic race, although
he had indicated that he was Caucasian on his employment application

210.
211.
212.
2010).
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Ipez, supra note 209, at 27.
Rich, supra note 206, at 1513.
No. 3:08-CV-00375-LRH-RAM, 2010 WL 653764 (D. Nev. Feb. 19,
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
598 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
Id.
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form. 2 21 Even though this case was brought under the symmetrical Title
VII,2 22 the court wrongly treated the plaintiffs identity as a question of

protected class.223 Instead of assessing the employer's behavior with
regard to its perception of the plaintiff's race, the court conducted its
own analysis of the plaintiffs race: "the Court notes that neither from
observing the Plaintiff nor from listening to his speech patterns,
mannerisms and pronunciation of the English language was it apparent
that Plaintiff was Hispanic." 224 In so doing, the court focused on
protected-class membership as a fixed characteristic-an objective and
static fact-rather than on the employer's perception and treatment of
the employee, and, in so doing, rejected the Plaintiffs claim.
A "regarded as" provision could be added to the definition of the
protected class to address these complicated identity-ascription cases.
But experience with these types of rules as part of the plaintiffs prima
facie case should make us skeptical of this approach. 225 Even tests that
were intended to make it easier for plaintiffs to pursue their claims
have been applied so narrowly as to have precisely the opposite
effect. 22 6 And the test-based approach to employment discrimination has
led courts to "reject new theories of discrimination, without actually
analyzing whether such theories are viable" under the statute. 227 This is
particularly concerning in the context of the protected class, as the law
must be able to respond to evolving conceptions of identity. 228 For these
reasons, scholars in the field have consistently advocated a more
flexible approach focusing on causation rather than the accretion of still
more tests that serve as hurdles to rights-claiming.229

221.
Id. at 957.
222.
See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
223.
Nieves, 598 F. Supp. at 961.
224.
Id. at 961-62; see also Rich, supra note 206, at 1551.
225.
See Mayerson, supra note 53, at 590-91 (describing restrictive
application of "regarded as" prong under the ADA).
226.
See Sperino, supra note 191, at 88-91 (explaining how the prima facie
case was meant to ease the difficulty of proving causation but has been applied rigidly
to make it harder for plaintiffs to establish claims); Goldberg, supra note 191, at 734
(same for comparator test).
227.
Sperino, supra note 191, at 71. See Goldberg, supra note 191, at 734 (the
requirement of comparator evidence "sharply narrow[s] . . . the very meaning of
discrimination").
228.
See supra notes 209-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of
evolving conceptions of race.
229.
See Goldberg, supra note 191, at 787-91, 807-12 (advocating for more
reliance on the approach taken in the sexual harassment and stereotyping contexts,
which flexibly examines the question of causation); Sperino, supra note 191, at 115-18
(advocating for a more flexible approach to the core question of discrimination); Stein
et al., supra note 12, at 737 (advocating for shifting the focus of the ADA inquiry from
the rigid definition of disability to the more flexible causation question).
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C. Politics

'

A symmetrically designed law also brings political benefits, as the
universality of such laws helps to enhance support for them. Several
theories of political support relate to what political scientists refer to as
"targeted" as compared with "universal" laws.230 Mapping their
language to our task here, asymmetrical laws are targeted, and
symmetrical laws are universal. The first theory, median voter theory,
predicts that policy choices will tend to align with the preferences of the
median voter, and thus that policies will tend to be moderate,
eschewing the preferences on one side of the spectrum or another.2 3
This leads to the "paradox of redistribution": that for policies with
redistributive consequences, a more universal law will attain more
redistribution in the long run because it will garner more political
support (by benefiting the median voter).232 This would suggest that a
symmetrical law, or at least one broad enough to capture the median
voter, would garner more support.
The second theory, public choice theory, focuses on the costs of
organizing and the problem of collective action. It posits that policies
with concentrated benefits are more likely to garner support than those
with diffuse benefits because of the free-rider problem.233 If benefits are
diffused across a larger population of people, many of the beneficiaries
will be tempted to free ride, and thus there will be insufficient
mobilization in support of the law.234 This suggests that an
asymmetrical law, which provides more concentrated benefits, would
garner more support than a symmetrical law.
The first and second theories can be critiqued for taking
preferences to be stable and exogenous to legal design, and failing to
consider how policies shape preferences. The third theory, policy

230.
See Theda Skocpol, Targeting within Universalism: Politically Viable
Policies to Combat Poverty in the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 411, 412
(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
231.
The seminal work on the median voter model is ANTHONY DOWNS, AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
232.
See Walter Korpi & Joakim Palme, The Paradox of Redistribution and
Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western
Countries, 63 AM. Soc. REV. 661, 681-82 (1998).
233.
See generally MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A
THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS (1981); James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation,
in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357 (1980). Although the dispersion of costs also

matters, I focus here simply on the benefits, as the dispersion of costs is relatively
constant regardless of symmetry or asymmetry.
234.
MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 11 (1965); Wilson, supra note 233, at 367.
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feedback theory, posits that policies create politics. 235 As political
scientist Theda Skocpol argues: "[P]olicies, once enacted, restructure
subsequent political processes." 23 6 She further argues: "Policies not
only flow from prior institutions and politics; they also reshape
institutions and politics, making some future developments more likely,
and hindering the possibilities for others." 237
This is because policy affects resources and incentives for the
mobilization of political actors and groups, and generates interpretive
effects that shape how we make sense of a complex political world. 2 38
For these reasons, individuals and groups may come to define
themselves in light of policies and thus seek to reinforce them.239
It is this third theory that I am particularly interested in. As we can
see, both symmetrical and asymmetrical antidiscrimination laws have
garnered sufficient support for passage. My aim is to assess how the
design of the law-symmetrical or asymmetrical-affects the politics of
antidiscrimination law after the law has passed. And research suggests
that symmetry will have positive effects on politics in ways that must be
appreciated.
Scholars of policy feedback, including Skocpol and sociologist
William Julius Wilson, have highlighted how universalism can generate
more positive forms of policy feedback, in particular in the context of
race. Skocpol has documented the failure of more targeted welfare
programs in the United States, including poorhouses, pensions, and the
"war on poverty" of the 1960s and 70s, and blames their failure on the
fact that their limited scope led these programs to be politically
unpopular, which resulted in low levels of investments, and prompted
public backlash. 2 4 By contrast, she highlights the success of universal
welfare programs, such as civil war benefits, health education services
for mothers and children, and Social Security, which have enjoyed
more political support and entrenchment. 2 41 Along similar lines, Wilson
has argued that from the perspective of improving the position of black
Americans, universal programs rather than race-based programs are

This is drawn from E.E. Schattschneider's famous claim that "[n]ew
235.
policies create a new politics." E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PoLTICs, PRESSURES AND THE
TARIFF 288 (1935).
THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL
236.
ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 58 (1992).

Id. at 531.
237.
See Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and
238.
PoliticalChange, 45 WORLD POL. 595, 595 (1993).
239.
Id.
See THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE
240.
PossIBILITIEs IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 253-59 (1995).

241.

See id. at 259-66.
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more likely to be successful.242 Wilson suggests that race-based
redistributional policies generate animosity towards the beneficiaries of
these policies and the policies themselves, and thus that universal
programs are more beneficial to minorities.243 With regard to race,
Skocpol extends Wilson's argument by suggesting that universal
programs build solidarity that will benefit minorities by avoiding an
"'us' versus 'them'" mentality. 2" When their own values and needs are
met by a law, "larger numbers of middle-class American citizens would
be prepared to go the extra mile for especially needy minorities. "245
While these scholars were referencing governmental programs
aimed at redistribution, we might adopt lessons from these policies in
the context of antidiscrimination law. While employment discrimination
law does not rely on any public transfers per se, they do amount to
government mandates on private (and public) employers to redistribute
the most significant form of private support: work. 2" When viewed in
this light, we can see the impact of a symmetrical antidiscrimination
law in terms of policy feedback on the basis of the reasoning set forth
above. Under this view, a symmetrical antidiscrimination law, by virtue
of its universalism, is likely to generate more positive policy feedback,
with more successful results. As compared with an asymmetrical law, it
is less likely to generate resentment against its beneficiaries, and is
more likely to generate a broader sense of solidarity in a universal
antidiscrimination project that can bring benefits, at least in theory, to
everyone.
In the legal context, we can also see this type of argument working
at the level of the individual case, such that a symmetrical law will
likely generate more support specifically from judges.247 A judge may
be more inclined to decide for a plaintiff when that judge is able to
identify with that person. 2 " Judges, especially the federal judges who
decide a large portion of employment discrimination cases, are
disproportionately white, able-bodied men. They are thus more likely to

242.
CrrY,

See WILLIAM Juuus WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 8, 10-11 (2d ed. 1987).

243.
Id.
244.
LINDA FAYE WILLIAMS, THE CONSTRAINT OF RACE 394 (2003); see also
Skocpol, supra note 230, at 414, 419, 432-33.
245.
Id. at 434.
246.
See generally Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881
(2000) (discussing the critical role of work for both material and non-support).
247.
I thank Aziz Huq for raising this point.
248.
See Carol T. Kulik et al., Here Comes the Judge: The Influence of Judge
Personal Characteristicson FederalSexual Harassment Case Outcomes, 27 L. & HuM.
BEHAV. 69, 69 (2003); Theodore Ruger et al., The Supreme Court ForecastingProject:
Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004).
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identify with a person without disfavored traits with respect to race,
gender, and disability (although not age). Hence, we are likely to see,
all things equal, a larger volume of more favorable precedent with a
symmetrical law. In contrast, with an asymmetrical law, we may well
see courts crafting an aversive body of precedent that makes recovery
difficult.
Note that it is not the case that positive policy feedback invariably
results from universal benefits laws. For example, the FMLA, a law
that universally provides unpaid family and self-care leave to workers
regardless of sex, has not been considered a very effective policy.249
Political scientists have attributed the lack of positive policy feedback to
weak policy design. The fact that the FMLA is unpaid means that many
workers cannot afford to use it, and thus the program did not bring the
types of positive changes to beneficiaries' lives that would lead to
support.250 Moreover, the complicated design of the law meant that
even seven years after the law was passed, nearly half of all workers
had not even heard of it, and half did not know if they were eligible for
it.251 The argument then is that, all else equal, universalism brings
political benefits to laws aiming at redistribution.
With this in mind, we can look at our experience with Title VII
and the ADA through the lens of policy feedback. The ADA has been
far less successful in achieving its goals as compared with Title VII. 25 2
As Professor Michael Waterstone chronicles, although the ADA
garnered a lot of support in Congress, it has not achieved two of its
most important goals.253 First, the ADA was meant to restructure
workplaces in a way that would increase the employment rates of the
disabled.2 4 But ADA cases have had abysmally low success rates, and,
as discussed above, the employment rates of the disabled fell rather

249.
See CHRISTOPHER HowARD, THE WELFARE STATE NOBODY KNows:
DEBUNKING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. SOCIAL POLICY 204 (2007).
250.
Id. This problematizes the analysis of legal scholar Julie Suk, who blames
the FMLA's relative lack of success on its universalism. See Julie C. Suk, Are Gender
Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family
Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2010). Suk argues that it was the choice to make the
FMLA universal, allowing both men and women to take family leave and self-care
leave, that generated more opposition from business interests and thus weakened the
FMLA. Id. at 17-23. But this argument only addresses how universalism shaped the
response of the law's opponents, and fails to account for how other design choices in
the FMLA meant that it generated little support even from its beneficiaries, despite its
universalism.
251.
See HowARD, supra note 249, at 253 n.26.
252.
See Michael Waterstone, The Costs of Easy Victory, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 587, 594-95 (2015).
253.
Id.
254.
Id.
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than rose after the passage of the ADA.255 Second, the ADA was meant
to create a new way of thinking about disability-that those with
disabilities are not intrinsically limited, but instead have been held back
by environmental features that can be changed.256 Again, this goal has
not been achieved. Courts still conceive of disability in the old medical
model. 257 Waterstone attributes the ADA's failure-what we might
think of as the lack of positive policy feedback-in part to the ADA
covering a large, amorphous group of those with disabilities. 5 But
given the research on policy feedback, it seems more likely that at least
one of the factors contributing to the relative failure of the ADA is that
its beneficiaries consist of too targeted a group rather than too large a
group, particularly when compared with the relative success of the
universal Title VII.
III. TOWARDS SYMMETRY

Before endorsing a symmetrical approach, the benefits as they
apply to each of the traits under consideration, as well as any costs of
symmetry, must be analyzed. This is the task undertaken at the outset
of this Part, which concludes that the benefits of symmetry outweigh
any costs for each of these traits. And even if we decide that a
symmetrical law is preferable, there are still questions as to exactly how
symmetrical the law should be across various doctrines. This Part next
considers these questions, exploring how symmetry should be
implemented at the doctrinal level. This has significant implications for
current symmetrical law, as the analysis suggests a move towards more
symmetry.
To keep the analysis tractable, this Article has focused on
symmetry and asymmetry in the context of four protected traits in the
area of employment discrimination law. This Part makes clear the
broader implications of the analysis. It concludes by applying the
insights of this Article to additional contexts: to additional protected
traits-appearance and sexual orientation-that have been adopted or
are under consideration in several states, and to additional areas of
law-housing, education, and constitutional law.
A. Weighing Benefits and Costs
Before proceeding forward with proposals for more symmetry,
two issues must be considered: (1) how the analysis of symmetry and
255.
256.
257.
258.

See id. at 616; supra note 118 and accompanying text.
Waterstone, supra note 252, at 616-17.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 620.
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asymmetry varies across protected traits, and (2) the possible costs of
symmetry. As for the first point, while there are substantial reasons to
prefer symmetry to asymmetry in the design of antidiscrimination law,
not all of these reasons apply equally to each of the traits under
consideration. Therefore, this Part evaluates the arguments for
symmetry on a trait-by-trait basis. It concludes that regardless of the
trait, there are substantial benefits to symmetry. It then considers the
possible costs of symmetry. Because none of the possible costs raise
real concerns, this Part concludes that the benefits of symmetry
outweigh the costs for each of the traits under consideration.
1. TRAIT-BY-TRAIT ANALYSIS

a. Age
Perhaps the strongest case for symmetry is in the context of age, a
trait that now receives asymmetrical protection. All of the
antisubordination reasons supporting symmetry-the cost of the
mandate,259 the presence of interlocking stereotypes, 26 and the
heterogeneity of disadvantage 26 1-apply strongly to age, in addition to
the anticlassification purpose. 262 The antisubordination arguments for a
symmetrical law are so strong here because it is not entirely clear that,
all things considered, older rather than younger workers are the
disadvantaged group. 263
The practical and political reasons to support a symmetrical law
are weaker in the context of age. Of all the protected traits, age is the
only one that is easily quantifiable. 264 This makes for a neatly defined

protected class, 265 as well as easy determinations about who falls within

259.
See supra Part II.A.2.a.
260.
See supra Part II.A.2.b.
261.
See supra Part II.A.2.c.
262.
See supra Part II.A.1.
263.
See supra notes 160-164 and accompanying text.
264.
See Schuck, supra note 184, at 32 n.22.
265.
An asymmetrical law would still require policymakers to decide where to
draw this line, with all of the attendant over- and under-inclusiveness problems
associated with line-drawing. See id. at 34 & n.28 ("[C]Iassifications embracing large
populations will be 'under-inclusive' or 'over-inclusive,'" and "[i]n this respect, age
classifications do not differ, except perhaps in degree, from those based upon other
characteristics."). We might understand the line-drawing problems to be harder here
because there is no age at which we can be reasonably comfortable that significant
discrimination on the basis of old age does not apply. See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, The
Brutal Agefsm of Tech: Years of Experience, Plenty of Talent, Completely Obsolete,
NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117088/siliconsvalleys-brutal-ageism [https://perma.cc/V9P2-AZUWI (reporting on ageism in Silicon
Valley starting at age thirty).
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the class.2 From a political perspective, age is the one trait that might
be thought of as universal by nature. We all expect that we will become
older workers one day, and thus even younger workers might view the
law as benefiting them, in that it will benefit their future selves. Thus, a
symmetrical law may not be necessary to garner political benefits.
Moreover, the protected group-those over forty-is the advantaged
group when it comes to political power. Nonetheless, the overwhelming
benefits for the purpose of the law weigh strongly in favor of
symmetry.
b. Sex
and
arguments-both
anticlassification
The
purpose
antisburdination-apply strongly in the context of sex. Because of the
strength of interlocking stereotypes between men and women, allowing
men to challenge sex stereotypes is critical to dismantling them.267
Occupational segregation also renders a symmetrical law necessary to
address the disadvantage men face in a number of desirable
occupations.268 These purpose arguments underscore the key role of
symmetry for combatting the subordination of women: if men are not
free to express feminine traits, these traits will be maintained in a
"female ghetto, [and] may continue to be devalued," further reinforcing
the subordination of women.269 There is also good reason to think that a
symmetrical law would reduce the negative distributive consequences of
the mandate on women in light of the publicity afforded to the
increasing volume of discrimination suits brought by men.270
A symmetrical sex discrimination law also addresses the practical
concerns associated with an asymmetrical sex discrimination law that
would require determining the sex of transgender plaintiffs. As for
politics, one might argue that symmetry is not necessary to gain the
support of men because heterosexual marriage intertwines the economic
fates of men and women. However, historically marriage has not been
enough to lead men to see their economic interests as aligned with
women, and the role of marriage here has surely only declined with a
decline in marriage rates."'
266.
One more complicated determination is whether protection applies to an
individual's perceived rather than actual age. Current asymmetrical law is silent on this
question, and ostensibly excludes claims on this basis. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2012)
(limiting application of ADEA "to individuals who are at least 40 years of age").
267.
See supra notes 135-144 and accompanying text.
268.
See supra notes 165-178 and accompanying text.
269.
Case, supra note 30, at 3.
270.
See supra notes 103-109 and accompanying text.
271.
See Andrew L. Yarrow, Falling Marriage Rates Reveal Economic Fault
Lines,
N.Y.
TIMEs,
Feb.
8,
2015,
at
ST15,
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c. Race and National Origin

When it comes to the purpose of antidiscrimination law, the
benefits of symmetry in the context of race are weaker than in the
context of age and sex. Interlocking stereotypes and heterogeneity of
disadvantage are less present here.272 The benefits of symmetry sound
instead in reducing racial classifications,273 and in distributing the cost
of the mandate more equally.274 There is good reason to think that a
symmetrical law will at least make some dent in the cost of the mandate
weighing wholly on minorities because of beliefs about the prevalence
of reverse discrimination.275 The anticlassification arguments may
weigh more strongly in the context of race not only in light of history,
but in continuing distinctions in social acceptability of race
classifications as compared with age, sex, and disability
classifications.276
Benefits of a symmetrical race discrimination law can also be seen
when it comes to the implementation of the protected class
requirement.27 Given courts' tendency to police cases 4 trictly at the
prima facie stage, a symmetrical law that avoids the need for
classification would lead courts to adopt fluid rather than fixed notions
of identity that make it easier for plaintiffs to proceed on their claims.278
And when it comes to politics, as Wilson and Skocpol argue, universal
laws garner more political support, and thus can be more effective than
targeted laws at promoting equality.27 9

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/fashion/weddings/falling-marriage-rates-reveal-

economic-fault-lines.html [https://perma.cc/T4ND-R4Z7] (reporting on census data
showing that the number of married households fell to 50.5% in 2012 from a high of
72% in 1960).
272.
See supra notes 147-148, 180-184 and accompanying text.
273.
See supra Part II.A.1.
274. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
275.
See id.
276. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, All the World's the Men's Room, 74 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1655, 1656, 1663 (2007) (noting that we still accept sex segregation in schools,
athletics, and bathrooms); Schuck, supra note 184, at 31-32 (cataloguing multiple
accepted age classifications). You can see this reflected in varying levels of
constitutional scrutiny afforded to these traits, from rational basis review for age and
disability, to intermediate scrutiny for sex, to strict scrutiny for race. See supra notes
37, 44.
277.
See Jones, supra note 188, at 1554 ("Sometimes it is impossible to
determine a person's race, national origin, or ethnicity-especially in a social context
where there are a number of racial groups and where race-mixing is on the rise.").
278.
See supra notes 209-215 and accompanying text.
279.
See supra notes 240-246 and accompanying text.
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d. Disability

Disability presents an admittedly contestable and contingent case
for symmetry. At first blush, there might not seem to be any reason to
implement a symmetrical disability discrimination law even from an
anticlassification perspective, as it might be hard to think of instances
when an able-bodied worker might use the law. But there are such
instances. Aside from affirmative action programs,280 the disabled might
be favored when the perceived talents of the disabled match the
necessary skills for the job,281 or when a person with a disability is seen
as necessary for authenticity or to serve as role model.282 These
instances are enough for an anticlassification purist to support
symmetry. 283
But the few instances of discrimination against the able-bodied
means that there is no heterogeneity of disadvantage, and little in the
way of interlocking stereotypes manifested in actions against the ablebodied. As for antisubordination purposes then, the primary benefit
symmetry can bring is the reduction or elimination of the negative
employment consequences of an asymmetrical mandate like the
ADA.284 Note that precisely because of the few instances in which the
able-bodied are discriminated against, simply making the law
symmetrical by allowing anyone to sue on the basis of disability status
under the existing definition of disability-e.g., the hearing employee
denied a job by an employer with a preference for the deaf 285-would
be insufficient to distribute the cost of the mandate more equally.
Given the otherwise weak case for symmetry in the disability
context, the proposal for symmetry here is of a distinct type. The
approach would be to universalize the class of who can be considered
280.
See 41 C.F.R. § 60.741(b)(2) (2014) (setting forth disability-based
affirmative action obligations of federal contractors).
281.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (citing examples of deaf workers
in factories and autistic workers in certain technical positions).
282.
See Ortner v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., No. 91 CA 3146, 1992 WL
438011 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 1992) (paralyzed worker preferred to fill position at
Paralyzed Veterans of America); Nick Anderson, Gallaudet Marks 'Deaf President
Now,'
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
7,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/gallaudet-marks-deaf-presidentnow/2013/02/07/17666740-6fdc-11e2-8b8d-e0b59alb8e2a-story.html
[https://perma.cc/Q7BZ-4NQZ] (deaf president preferred for university for deaf
students).
283.
An anticlassificationist might still allow an exception if disability is
necessary to render the individual "qualified" for the position. See 42 U.S.C. §
12111(8) (2012) (permitting employers not to hire those with disabilities if such
individuals are not "qualified").
284.
See supra note 119 (citing studies finding that the ADA substantially
reduced employment levels of the disabled).
285.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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disabled. This would be achieved by allowing anyone to claim that she
had been discriminated against on the basis of any physical or mental
impairment, and along with it the right to seek a reasonable
accommodation.286 Note that under this approach to symmetry for
disability, there would be few true "reverse" discrimination claims of
the sort where able-bodied workers challenge more favorable treatment
of disabled workers. 287 Rather, the idea would be to universalize the
ability to seek reasonable accommodations based on need or impairment
or some other common metric. If disability law adopted this type of
symmetry, there is good reason to believe that decisionmakers would
not assume that visibly disabled workers were systematically more
costly than those without a visible disability. A universal approach to
reasonable accommodations for antidiscrimination purposes would not
be unprecedented, as the right to a reasonable accommodation on the
basis of religion applies to all employees, believers and non-believers
alike. Scholars have suggested benefits of this approach in the context
of disability.2 89
The analysis of disability in Part II allows for a reconsideration of
the primary objection to this universal approach to disability law, raised
by Professor Sam Bagenstos: that it fails to focus on the category of
persons with conditions that have historically been subordinated. 2 ' As
he writes:

286.
This would also include the ability to raise a claim that the lack of a
disability resulted in discrimination, as in the role model and disability preference
cases.
287.
On the question of whether able-bodied workers could challenge as
disparate treatment the provision of a reasonable accommodation granted to a disabled
worker, the response is no. The worker instead would have to assert that she was
entitled to the same accommodation based on her need for it due to a similar
impairment.
288.
See, e.g., Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2003)
(noting that a hotel manager could seek an accommodation from meetings with religious
representatives delivering bibles if they would "offend [the employee]'s religious or
antireligious sensibilities"); EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 621
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that Title VII prohibits an employer from compelling its atheist
employees to attend religious services).
289.
Such a view of the ADA was first proposed by Professor Robert L.
Burgdorf. See Burgdorf, supra note 53, at 536 (arguing, inter alia, that this approach to
disability would better comport with civil rights law and that it would avoid the stigma
of being labeled "disabled" that might lead some not to make use of the law). Other
scholars have also written in favor of this view. See Stein et al., supra note 12, at 75055 (discussing similar proposal and arguing that it brings structural, expressive,
economic, and hedonic benefits, especially in light of an ageing and less able
workforce).
290.
Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 478-81.
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While every person at some point has some physical or mental
condition that could be described as an impairment, and many
may suffer isolated instances of poor treatment as a result,
only a smaller group of people is 'designated handicapped' in
the process . . . [and subject to] systematic disadvantage
through the mechanisms of prejudice, stereotypes, and
neglect.291
Under my analysis, however, the universal approach to disability
law is actually more antisubordinationist in its effect as compared with
a disability law that adopts a more limited protected class. This is
because a universal law can reduce or eliminate the harmful impact that
the ADA has had on the employment levels of disabled persons.
Finally, a symmetrical disability law would also bring practical
and political benefits. The protected-class approach under the ADA has
been identified as the key impediment to rights-claiming under the
ADA. 2" And a key reason for the ADA's relative lack of success may
well be that its asymmetry weakened support for law.293 One might
suppose that symmetry is unnecessary for political support in the
context of disability on somewhat similar grounds to age: because we
all might become disabled, we are all potential beneficiaries of the law.
However, optimism bias will lead non-disabled individuals not to view
themselves as potentially disabled, and thus symmetry would seem to
be necessary for broad support.294
2. CONCERNS

Before advocating for a more symmetrical antidiscrimination law,
any costs of symmetry must also be considered. Critics are likely to
raise the following concerns: (a) diluting the expressive function of
antidiscrimination law; (b) increasing economic costs of an expanded
antidiscrimination law; and (c) weakening employers' antisubordination
initiatives, such as voluntary affirmative action programs. This Part
discusses these concerns in turn, concluding that none present a
significant objection to symmetry.

291.
Id. at 479.
292.
See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
293.
See supra notes 252-258 and accompanying text.
294.
See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 93, at 1524 ("A common feature
of human behavior is overoptimism: People tend to think that bad events are far less
likely to happen to them than to others.").
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a. Expressive Function

"

In arguing above that a symmetrical law provides benefits for both
the
anticlassification
and
antisubordination
purposes
of
antidiscrimination law, my claims were grounded in the consequences
the law would have on the basis of the liability that it imposes on
regulated entities. But there may also be values at stake in regulating
discrimination that are not fully captured simply by looking at the
impact of imposing liability. The expressive function of law-that is,
the message that a law conveys-is one such value.295 As Professor
Cass Sunstein elucidates, the expressive function can be described as
important in two distinct regards: for the consequences that the message
the law sends has on social norms and behavior, and for the statement
in and of itself as "the expression of the appropriate evaluative attitude"
consistent with society's conception of itself.2
The expressive function of governmental action has been viewed as
particularly important in the area of antidiscrimination law in both
regards.297 As for the first function, "[a]ntidiscrimination law is often
designed to change norms so as to ensure that people are treated with a
kind of dignity and respect that discriminatory behavior seems to
deny." 2 98 As for the second function, "[a] society might . . . insist on
an antidiscrimination law for expressive reasons even if it does not
know whether the law actually helps members of minority groups. "299
Here, the concern that an expressivist would raise is as follows. I
make the case above that a symmetrical law better enforces the
antisubordination goals of antidiscrimination law.3 But for an
antisubordination expressivist, an asymmetrical law better expresses the
message that disadvantaged groups are most in need of discrimination
protection, or perhaps the even stronger proposition that discrimination
is wrongful only when it harms a subordinated group. An expressivist
focused purely on the second expressive function-the intrinsic value of
295.
See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive
Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1504 (2000);
Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1649,
1650-51 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92
MICH. L. REv. 779, 780 (1994) [hereinafter Sunstein, Incommensurability]; see
generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
2021 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Expressive Function]. But see generally Matthew D.
Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363
(2000) (critiquing the expressive theory of law).
296.
Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 295, at 822-23.
297.
See Adler, supra note 295, at 1428; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 295,
at 1533; Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 295, at 829.
298.
Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 295, at 2044.
299.
Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 295, at 823.
300.
See supra Part ll.A.2.
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the message-might then prefer an asymmetrical antidiscrimination law,
regardless of the law's consequences.
An asymmetrical antidiscrimination law thus presents "the most
important testing case[]" for expressivists, which "arise[s] when (a)
people support laws because of the statement made by such laws but (b)
the effects of such laws seem bad or ambiguous, even by reference to
the values held by their supporters." 30 1 The way out of this dilemma,
Sunstein suggests, is to recognize that "any support for 'statements'
[made by a law] should be rooted not simply in the intrinsic value of
the statement, but also in plausible judgments about its effect on social
norms and hence in 'on balance' judgments about its consequences."302
Sunstein illustrates his approach with an example quite close to
ours: minimum wage laws. One function of a minimum wage law might
be taken to be intrinsically expressive: a statement that human labor is
sufficiently valuable that it must be compensated at a particular rate,
and that any less compromises human dignity.30 3 But, as many
economists have posited, minimum wage laws may increase
unemployment of the most vulnerable workers. 30 While Sunstein
admits that "[i]t is not easy to know how to weigh the 'statement'
against the bad consequences," 30 5 he concludes that "if an increase in
minimum wage would really drive vulnerable people out of the
workplace in significant numbers, it is hard to see why people should
support it."3 On this basis, he rightly regards clinging to the intrinsic
expressive value of the law, even in the face of harmful consequences,
as expressive "fanaticism." 307 In other words, when expression and
effect conflict, expression must give way.308

301.
Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 295, at 2045.
Id.
302.
303.
Id. at 2046-47.
304.
Id. at 2047. As Sunstein recognizes, economists disagree on this point.
Id. at 2047 n.84.
305.
Id. at 2047. Here is where Sunstein's work on incommensurability
becomes relevant, as the expressive value of the statement and the material value of a
decline in employment cannot be weighed on the same scale, making it difficult to
compare them. See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 295, at 780.
Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 295, at 2047.
306.
307.
Id. (concluding that "without desirable effects on social norms, there is
not much point in endorsing expressively motivated law").
308.
An epigraph to Sunstein's article sums up the point quite well:
We are all Expressionists part of the time. Sometimes we just want to
scream loudly at injustice, or to stand up and be counted. These are noble
motives, but any serious revolutionist must often deprive himself of the
pleasures of self-expression. He must judge his actions by their ultimate
effects on institutions.
Id. at 2021 (quoting HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MY LIFE 281 (1991)).
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In the context of a symmetrical antidiscrimination law, the tension
between expression and effect is eased by considering the first function
of expression: the effect that the law's message will have on social
norms, attitudes, and behaviors. While a symmetrical law may not
that
about
discrimination
message
the
specific
convey
a
symmetrical
prefer,
most
would
antisubordinationists
antidiscrimination law is unlikely to have harmful consequences for
social norms regarding the respect and dignity accorded to subordinated
groups, as they too are included within a symmetrical law. In fact, even
symmetrical antidiscrimination laws like Title VII have had significant
positive effects on social attitudes towards subordinated groups.3
Therefore, a symmetrical law should trouble only those
antisubordinationists who are concerned with the second, but not the
first, expressive function of law. And in such cases of tension,
expression should give way: the intrinsic expressive objection loses its
force when, in fact, "norms are held constant," or even improved, and
the circumstances of those persons the law is intended to benefit
improve.310
We might also ease the tension between expression and effect by
recognizing that even the intrinsic expressive message a law sends may
change over time as the consequences of the law become clear. If a
symmetrical antidiscrimination law in fact accrues to the benefit of
subordinated groups, such laws may come to be seen as incorporating
an antisubordination message, or at least a message of respect and
dignity for subordinated groups. This has arguably occurred in the
context of Title VII. 311 And if a symmetrical law comes to be
recognized as better at achieving antisubordination aims than an
asymmetrical law, as this Article argues, a symmetrical law may even
come to embody the antisubordination message better as well.
b. Economic Costs
A symmetrical law, by expanding the universe of who can bring
claims and the types of claims that are cognizable, would be expected
to increase the number of discrimination claims. This rise in lawsuits
raises cost concerns of two kinds-increased costs for judicial
administration, and increased costs for employers-which are discussed
in turn.
As for judicial administration, the concern is that the rise in
discrimination litigation will burden courts and the agencies responsible
for administering these laws. Our experience with Title VII should
309.
310.
311.

See id. at 2043.
Id. at 2046.
See id. at 2043.
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alleviate some of this concern. Even though Title VII is symmetrical,
there has never been an explosion of "reverse" discrimination suits,
although they have grown over the years. 312 Given the heterogeneity of
disadvantage in the context of age, and an expanded right to
accommodation under disability law, we might expect more reverse
suits in these contexts. But the experience of states that have adopted
symmetrical age discrimination laws does not show a swamping of their
courts with suits by young workers."' And the volume of litigation
alone should not concern us, particularly if we have reason to believe
that employers engage in appreciable amounts of discrimination against
the young and against the able-bodied who are impaired. Judicial
administration costs are justified if the benefits of allowing such
additional suits outweigh the costs, and, as we saw in Part II, the
benefits are substantial.
As for the costs imposed on employers, increasing costs for the
employer by making the advantaged group as costly as the
disadvantaged group-at least as a matter of perception-is precisely
one of the goals of a symmetrical law.314 Therefore, we should not be
too troubled if the law in fact does increase costs in this way.
Moreover, there is little reason to believe that symmetry will bring any
explosion of litigation, as we can see under Title VII or symmetrical
state age discrimination laws.315
The reasonable accommodation mandate under the ADA imposes
costs, and suits under this provision might be the most likely to increase
substantially under a symmetrical regime. However, accommodations
are not as costly as often assumed,3 16 and accommodation costs are
likely to decline over time.3 17 Moreover, the costs can only be

312.
See Kuehner-Hebert, supra note 96.
313.
See James L. Buchwalter, Cause of Action for DiscriminationAgainst
Younger Person in Favor of Older Persons, CAUSES OF ACTION SECOND SERIES § 2
(noting only a "smattering" of reverse age discrimination cases have been filed).
Reputation concerns that would linger longer over a younger worker's career might be
an impediment to suit.
314.
See supra Part II.A.2.a.
315.
See Anne M. Payne, Litigation for Discrimination Against Younger
Persons in Favor of Older Persons, 138 AM. JUR. TRIALS 105, § 1 (discussing research
on litigation of reverse age discrimination claims under state law); Kuehner-Hebert,
supra note 96, at 30 (citing relatively low figures for reverse discrimination claims
under Title VII).
316.
Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers with
Disabilities, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 314, 322-23 (2000) (summarizing data on
costs of accommodations, which find the typical cost to be $200).
317.
See Bagenstos, supra note 119, at 556-57.
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appreciated when assessed along with the benefits, and the benefits are
substantial.318

Of course, it may be the case that whatever costs symmetrical
antidiscrimination laws impose on employers are passed along to
employees in the form of reduced employment and/or wages.319 While a
symmetrical law may depress the employment levels or wages of all
workers, if one of the key aims of antidiscrimination law is to benefit
disadvantaged groups, a symmetrical law at a minimum does not
operate contrary to its purposes by placing the burden of equality solely
on disadvantaged workers, and instead distributes the cost of the
mandate equally, across all workers.
c. AntisubordinationInitiatives
From an antisubordination perspective, critics might be concerned
that a symmetrical law would present a barrier to antisubordination
initiatives. If the advantaged group has a right not to be discriminated
against, members of that group can challenge as disparate treatment an
affirmative action program meant to benefit a disadvantaged group, or
any race-, sex-, age-, or disability-conscious measures taken to alleviate
a disparate impact on a disadvantaged group. As an initial matter, it is
important to remember that symmetry is not synonymous with a ban on
all classifications. Current symmetrical law permits employers to
implement an affirmative action program, and requires employers to
take actions to avoid a disparate impact on disadvantaged groups.320
And a symmetrical law can allow privileged groups to take advantage
of the same theories: for example, an employer could apply an
affirmative action program to attract male nurses, or a nursing program
that relies on word-of-mouth recruiting with a disparate impact on men

See Stein et al., supra note 12, at 754 (arguing that a universal ADA
318.
would reduce sick leave, workers' compensation and other insurance claims, and postinjury rehabilitation costs); supra notes 280-293 and accompanying text (discussing the
benefits of symmetry in the context of disability); supra note 289 (citing scholars
highlighting additional benefits of a universal ADA).
319.
See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
economic impact of universal mandates on workers.
320.
See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987)
(permitting affirmative action under Title VII under appropriate circumstances); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (providing for disparate impact liability under
Title VII); see also Cynthia Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration,
and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3-4
(2005) (noting that Johnson is the latest Supreme Court pronouncement on affirmative
action under Title VII, although it may have been weakened by later case law).
Whether disparate impact liability applies to favored groups under Title VII is unclear.
See infra notes 352-356.
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could be challenged by men.3 2 1 With this in mind, the concerns
regarding affirmative action and disparate impact will be discussed in
turn. There isn't much cause for concern about either.
As for affirmative action, Title VII permits employers to engage in
affirmative action so long as the program is "designed to 'eliminate
manifest [identity] imbalances in traditionally segregated job
categories,'322 and so long as it does not "unnecessarily trammel the
interests of [advantaged] employees." 3 2 3 Any new symmetrical law
could adopt a similar approach. While this would not satisfy an
anticlassificationist purist, who might prefer no different standard for
affirmative action, this still provides far more protection against
classifications than an asymmetrical law.324
The question from the antisubordination perspective is whether
employers would be likely to engage in more voluntary affirmative
action under an asymmetrical law.325 While this is an empirical
question, there is little reason to think that there would be substantially
more affirmative action under an asymmetrical law.326 Unlike in the
education context, where universities have displayed a robust
preference to seek diverse student bodies on the basis of voluntary
affirmative action programs, employers have never shown this level of
enthusiasm for affirmative action.327 Most firms, unlike most
educational institutions, are driven by profit. Their primary concern is
efficiency, not diversity. Most employers would view affirmative action
to run contrary to efficiency." And aside from legal barriers to
321.
See infra notes 332-36 for a further discussion of the symmetrical
application of disparate impact liability.
322.
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628.
323.
United Steelworkers of Am., ALF-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 221
(1979).
324.
See supra note 62 on the divergence between anticlassification concerns
and symmetry.
325.
Antisubordinationists might also prefer a laxer standard for affirmative
action programs under a symmetrical law than the one that currently applies under Title
VII. The analysis below suggests that this would not make much difference for an
employer's likelihood of adopting an affirmative action program.
326.
For this reason, this Article sidesteps the question of the precise standard
under which affirmative action programs are evaluated under employment
discrimination law.
327.
See Estlund, supra note 320, at 4-5. Distinct from affirmative action,
employers do seek out workers from historically disadvantaged (especially racial)
groups because they believe that a more diverse workforce will improve organizational
performance. See SKRENTNY, supra note 149, at 11-12; Estlund, supra note 320,at 4.
This is already happening under symmetrical law, and could be justified along the lines
of the diversity rationale adopted in the educational context. See id. at 19-38.
328.
This might not be the case in two scenarios: (1) if irrational
discrimination is leading to inefficient employment decisions, and the best way to
address this irrational discrimination is through an affirmative action program, or (2) if
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voluntary affirmative action, employers also face social barriers to
these programs. Given the contested acceptance of affirmative action by
the public generally, firms would rightly be concerned that the adoption
of a fulsome affirmative action program might lead to a public backlash
against the firm, on the ground that the firm unfairly engages in
"reverse" discrimination.329 There is little reason then to believe that
employers would engage in substantially more affirmative action under
an asymmetrical law. There may of course be outlier firms more
sensitive to diversity concerns that would engage in more affirmative
action under an asymmetrical regime. But they are too few to alter the
conclusion that a symmetrical law would have a minimal effect on
affirmative action.
In support of this conclusion, we can look to evidence from
current asymmetrical law, and assess whether employers have engaged
in substantial affirmative action to benefit older workers or disabled
workers. The short answer is no. Aside from the type of mandatory
affirmative action that applies to government contractors for all
protected traits, 3 3 employers have not engaged in significant affirmative
action.33 1 In any event, the bulk of these voluntary programs would pass
muster under a symmetrical law with an affirmative action standard like
Title VII.3
Likewise, a symmetrical law is unlikely to have much effect on
employers engaging in measures to eliminate a disparate impact on

members of the disadvantaged group perform better in the job (e.g., if deaf factory
workers actually outperform hearing factory workers), and a bona fide affirmative
action program was a way to get around the ban on discrimination in hiring.
Even if not for efficiency purposes, one might imagine that a concern about
disparate impact liability by subordinated groups might press employers to engage in
more affirmative action under an asymmetrical regime. But even this concern is not
likely to make much of a difference, given how few disparate impact lawsuits are
brought, and how still fewer succeed. See Selmi, supra note 43, at 738-40.
329.
See supra notes 110-112.
330.
See 41 C.F.R. § 60.741 (2016) (setting forth affirmative action
requirements for federal contractors based on disability similar to other programs for
other protected traits).
331.
This explains the need for law and public campaigns to encourage
employers to hire individuals with disabilities. See 26 U.S.C. § 190 (2016) (allowing
tax deduction for the cost of removing architectural barriers for disabled employees);
id. § 44 (same for cost of providing access); Carlos Slim Held & Anthony K. Shriver,
Pledging "I'm In to Hire" Individuals with Intellectual Developmental Disabilities,
FoRBEs
(Oct.
21,
2014,
5:06
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/10/21/pledging-im-in-to-hire-individualswith-intellectual-and-developmental-disabilities [https://perma.cc/VR8A-2RFC].
332.
See Estlund, supra note 320, at 5-6 (discussing how employers seeking
diversity could justify an affirmative action program under current law).
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disadvantaged groups. Alleviating disparate impact is costly, 333 and thus
few employers will engage in it voluntarily for the same reason that few
employers will engage in voluntary affirmative action. " As for the
legal mandate that employers avoid imposing a disparate impact, even a
symmetrical law will not undermine this mandate as it operates in
practice. The disparate impact claim was intended with
antisubordination purposes, to target employer policies that have an
adverse effect on disadvantaged groups. In theory, a symmetrical law
poses a challenge to the disparate impact claim and its antisubordination
aim. This is because an advantaged group can challenge as disparate
treatment an employer's protected-trait-conscious actions taken to avoid
disparate impact liability. In Ricci v. DeStefano,3 35 for example, white
firefighters challenged the city of New Haven's decision to disregard
tests on which the white firefighters had succeeded to avoid a disparate
impact on black firefighters.336 The Court held that such actions taken
to avoid disparate impact constitute disparate treatment "unless the
employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not
taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact
statute. "33
In practice, however, the potential for advantaged groups to
challenge an employer's actions taken to avoid disparate impact liability
will have little impact on the antisubordination effect of employment
discrimination law. This is because disparate impact liability is already
essentially a dead letter: there are few suits, and even fewer that
prevail.338 The Ricci context of employment tests is the outlier
circumstance in which disparate impact liability has had an effect.339
Any cost to disparate impact liability must be weighed against the
beneficial effects of symmetry set forth above. Given the rarity of
disparate impact suits, the benefits of symmetry are far more important
to the antisubordination impact of employment discrimination law.

333.
See generally Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation,
115 HARV. L. REv. 642 (2001).
334.
See supra notes 325-328 and accompanying text.
335.
557 U.S. 557 (2009).
336.
Id.
337.
Id. at 563.
338.
See Selmi, supra note 43, at 738-40. For this reason, this Article
sidesteps commenting on the appropriate standard for evaluating disparate treatment
suits challenging employer's actions taken to avoid a disparate impact. And there is
reason to believe that even Ricci, which some have lamented as permitting employers
too little latitude to engage in efforts to avoid disparate impact, is not as restrictive as it
appears. See Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REv.
1341, 1369 (2010) (arguing that Ricci is limited to the exceptional case where the
victims of an employer's efforts to avoid disparate impact are readily apparent).
339.
See Primus, supra note 338, at 1369, 1372-73.
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A separate question of course is whether the law should require
employers to engage in more fulsome antisubordination initiatives, such
as affirmative action programs, or more intensive analyses of disparate
impact. Such a requirement would raise more of a problem under a
symmetrical law, and would require more careful balancing of the
benefits and costs of symmetry. Notably, advocates of requiring more
extensive antisubordination measures have assumed the benefits of
asymmetry, and have missed the countervailing benefits of symmetry
raised by this Article. 34 In any event, such a requirement is so far from
our current approach to antidiscrimination law that it raises only
theoretical concerns.
B. Implementation
Beyond the basic choice between symmetry and asymmetry, there
are additional questions associated with implementing a move towards
symmetry. First, once a law is symmetrical, a question arises as to
whether each of the theories of discrimination that the law recognizesdisparate treatment and disparate impact-should permit "reverse"
discrimination claims, and, if so, whether they should be subject to the
same standards of proof. Second, once a law designates a universal
protected class, questions remain as to the causation inquiry, that is,
whether an act by the employer was taken "because of' a protected
trait. This Part addresses these questions in turn.
1. DEGREE OF SYMMETRY

Disparate treatment claims are the heartland of employment
discrimination law, and a symmetrical law that did not allow reverse
claims under this theory could hardly be said to be symmetrical. But a
question arises as to whether the primary method of proof for such
claims-the McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green341 burdenshifting test-should be applied symmetrically to all claims.342 Courts
340.
See, e.g., MyrI L. Duncan, The Future of Affinnative Action: A
Jurisprudential/Legal Critique, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 503 (1982); Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in
the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1043.

341.

411 U.S. 792 (1973).

342.
This test first requires the plaintiff to set forth a prima facie case: (1) that
she belongs to a protected class; (2) that she applied to and was qualified for a position
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that she was rejected for the
position; and (4) that the position remained open after that rejection or the position was
offered to someone else. See id. at 802. Note that the first prong is meaningless for
symmetrical laws. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. If the plaintiff sets forth
a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to offer a nondiscriminatory
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"

"

are split on whether reverse discrimination plaintiffs must put forward
additional evidence of discrimination-of "background circumstances"
that support an inference that the defendant is the "unusual employer
who discriminates against the majority"-as part of this test.3
There are two arguments for some level of asymmetry in the
application of this standard, but neither holds water. First, the purpose
of the burden-shifting test is to weed out the most common nondiscriminatory explanations for an adverse employment action.3 " When
the plaintiff is a member of a subordinated group, once these reasons
are eliminated, it is reasonable to infer that the real reason is
discrimination, given the prevalence of discrimination against these
groups.345 When the plaintiff is a member of an advantaged group, we
might think that weeding out the most common non-discriminatory
reasons makes an inference of arbitrary decisionmaking by the
employer just as or more justified than an inference of discrimination.
For this reason, some have argued in favor of requiring additional
proof for reverse suits." But the heterogeneity of disadvantage
suggests that a more nuanced analysis is required to assess when a
reverse discrimination claim warrants an inference of discrimination
without any additional proof. For example, a younger worker might be
entitled to such an inference in a promotion case, and a male worker
might be entitled to such an inference in occupations where men have
been excluded.34 7 Because employers who discriminate against
advantaged groups in such scenarios are more typical than not, any rule
requiring additional evidence that the plaintiffs employer is somehow
"unusual" might unfairly limit these suits. 3
Second, for antisubordinationists, the primary purpose of
antidiscrimination law is to improve the employment opportunities of

reason for the failure to hire, which then foists the burden back on the plaintiff to prove
that the employer's reason is pretextual and that discrimination was the real reason for
the decision. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
343.
Compare Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir.
1999) (requiring additional evidence); Taken v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366,
1369 (10th Cir. 1997) (same); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 152-53 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(same); Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 66-67 (6th Cir. 1985)
(same), with Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301, 304 (11th Cir. 1991) (requiring no
additional evidence); Young v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 1990)
(same).
344.
See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("A
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only
because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not
based on the consideration of impermissible factors.").
345.
Id.
346.
See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1527-28.
347.
See supra Part II.A.2.c.
348.
Mills, 171 F.3d at 455.
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subordinated groups. 34 9 This might support a heightened burden for
applying the law outside of its primary purpose. 5 o But, as Part II
suggests, making it harder to pursue reverse discrimination suits can
actually undermine the antisubordination purposes of antidiscrimination
law, in two ways. First, applying a stricter proof standard to reverse
discrimination plaintiffs would make it more difficult to challenge the
interlocking stereotypes that subordinate disadvantaged groups. For
example, if the male plaintiff in Knussman v. Maryland,351 whose
employer told him that he could not take leave unless his wife was "in a
coma or dead,"352 had been subject to a heightened proof requirement,
he might not have been able to pursue his claim. The plaintiff was a
police officer, and there was no reason to believe that men would have
been discriminated against in that workplace. More generally, making it
harder for reverse discrimination plaintiffs to pursue claims would also
interfere with the ability of a symmetrical law to distribute the cost of
the mandate more equally. If it is harder for reverse plaintiffs to win
claims, they will bring fewer claims, making it less likely that
decisionmakers will perceive them as costly under the mandate.
As for disparate impact suits, it is not clear whether reverse
discrimination suits are cognizable under currently symmetrical law,
like Title VII. 353 Some scholars have argued that permitting reverse
disparate impact suits makes no sense in light of the antisubordination
origins of the doctrine, which was developed as a way to combat
employer policies that disadvantaged black employees.354 Putting aside
whether an asymmetrical standard here would pass constitutional
muster,355 it is questionable whether an asymmetrical regime for

349.
United Steelworkers of Am., ALF-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204
(1979) ("It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries
of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had 'been excluded from
the American dream for so long,' constituted the first legislative prohibition of all
voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial
segregation and hierarchy.") (internal citation omitted).
350.
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 12, at 53,
272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001).
351.
352.
Id. at 630.
353.
The question has not been before the Supreme Court, and the few cases
before appellate courts have resulted in a circuit split. Compare Craig v. Ala. State
Univ., 804 F.2d 682, 691 (11th Cir. 1986) (permitting disparate impact claim by white
employees), with Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir.
1986) (denying disparate impact claim by male employees); see also Sullivan, supra
note 12, at 1533.
354.
See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1507, 1512 (arguing that
"[a]pplying disparate impact beyond minorities and women is profoundly ahistorical
and inconsistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the theory").
355.
Compare Primus, supra note 14, at 585-86 (suggesting yes), with
Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1508 (suggesting no).
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disparate impact suits would further support the antisubordination
purposes of the law, except in an expressive way. In fact, there may be
instances when symmetry would bring benefits from an
antisubordination perspective, for example, a male nurse challenging a
word-of-mouth hiring policy.356 Moreover, walling off a category of
liability from reverse claims might undermine the equalizing purposes
of a symmetrical law from the perspective of reducing the cost of the
mandate born by subordinated groups. But because disparate impact
suits are such a small fraction of antidiscrimination litigation, their
treatment will not matter much for redistributing the cost of the
mandate, and we might not be overly concerned with the resolution of
this question."'
2. CAUSATION

While a universal protected class alleviates the most vexing
practical concerns with asymmetrical antidiscrimination laws, it does
not avoid the problem of defining the protected trait entirely. Even if
everyone is permitted to raise a claim of discrimination on the basis of
a protected trait, courts still need to determine causation: whether the
employer's action was taken "because of" the trait. This question
requires an understanding of which employer justifications fall within
the boundaries of the protected trait and which do not. Note that courts
already face these types of questions under both symmetrical and
asymmetrical laws. For example, this question arises in the context of
what have sometimes been called "performance" cases-cases that
entail the expression of an identity trait, such as a black worker wearing
braids. In such cases, courts must consider whether an employer's
decision on the basis of an employee's braided hair is a decision on the
basis of race.358
In a move from asymmetry to symmetry, determining causation
will raise the most new questions in the context of disability, because of

356.
See EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1993)
(dismissing suit challenging word-of-mouth hiring only on disparate treatment grounds).
357.
Reported cases addressing reverse disparate impact are quite rare. See
Sullivan, supra note 12, at 1530-32.
358.
Courts have split on this question. Compare, e.g., Hollins v. Atl. Co.,
188 F.3d 652, 661 (6th Cir. 1999) (yes), with Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F.
Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (no). See also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604, 609 (1993) (holding that employers who act on the basis of seniority have not
acted on the basis of age); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2004)
(holding that discrimination on the basis of transgenderism is discrimination on the
basis of sex).
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the ambiguity of what constitutes a "disability." 3 Scholars who have
urged a universal approach to the ADA have proposed that the
causation requirement is met when the employer takes an action on the
basis of a physical or mental impairment, whether real or perceived,
regardless of whether the impairment is substantially limiting or not,
long-term or temporary." Accordingly, a denial of reasonable
accommodation amounts to unlawful disparate treatment when an
employer fails to provide a necessary accommodation for such an
impairment.361 To be sure, this approach does not eliminate all
questions related to the understanding of causation on the basis of
disability, including what constitutes an "impairment, "362 and when an
accommodation is "needed." 363 Regardless of these questions, this
approach offers the key benefit of focusing on the employer's alleged
discriminatory treatment rather than on the plaintiff's identity

359.
See Waterstone, supra note 252, at 605-06 (explaining that while "no
movement is monolithic," that "the disability community is perhaps exceptional in its
diffuseness"; and that despite the "big tent" approach of the ADA that defines disability
expansively, there "remain significant divisions across and even within groups").
360.
See Burgdorf, supra note 53, at 571-73; Mayerson, supra note 53, at
597,
361.
See Burgdorf, supra note 53, at 573; Stein et al., supra note 12, at 737.
The law could accept the broad definition of impairment included in the
362.
regulations implementing the ADA:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more . . . body systems[, such as]
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary,
hemic, and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as an [intellectual disability
(formerly termed "mental retardation")], organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2000). A broader alternative to "impairment" might be
"condition," but impairment has the benefit of already being used and defined.
363.
For example, if a worker chooses to run marathons with the known
consequence of soreness that renders her unable to complete her job tasks, does this
worker "need" an accommodation? Note that this is not a new problem introduced by a
universal protected class, as courts already struggle with when an employer must be
given an accommodation to a worker whose need for the accommodation might be
considered self-induced, such as the failure to take mitigating measures to control
disability. See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 103 MICH. L. REv. 217 (2004) (discussing this problem and arguing
for a modified duty to mitigate). Courts have already developed approaches to address
how worker choice intersects with an employer's obligation of reasonable
accommodation. See id. at 219 nn.7-8 (collecting cases on the duty to mitigate). An
amendment to the ADA has clarified the question somewhat by establishing that for
most disabilities, the individual should be considered in an unmitigated state. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(4)(E)(i) (2012).
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classification, thereby avoiding the harms associated with treating
identity as a static concept inhering in the individual. 364
C. FurtherApplications
This Article's analysis of symmetry has broader application to
different protected traits and areas of law. This Section considers how
the analysis applies to two traits that lawmakers are currently
considering protecting: appearance and sexual orientation.365 Because
these traits receive no heightened scrutiny under the Constitution,
lawmakers are free to protect these traits either symmetrically or
asymmetrically.36 This Part then turns to areas of antidiscrimination
law outside of employment-housing, education, and constitutional
law-and provides some thoughts about the extent to which this
Article's analysis generalizes to them.
1. TRAITS

a. Appearance
Appearance is now only protected in a few jurisdictions ,367 but
there appears to be movement towards more legislation.3 68 Here, too,
symmetry would be beneficial, primarily due to the presence of
interlocking stereotypes and heterogeneity of disadvantage, as well as
the practical difficulties with a targeted protected class. In the case of
appearance, it is of course the unattractive who are the disadvantaged
group. Plain people earn less than average-looking people, who earn
less than good-looking people. 369
364.
See supra Part H.B.
365.
See S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013) (bill banning employment discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation); DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE
INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND LAW 110 (2010) (citing laws proposing a ban on
employment discrimination on the basis of appearance).
366.
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (applying rational basis
review to sexual orientation classifications); Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads
and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527, 533 (2014)
(making clear that rational basis review is the default approach unless a trait has been
afforded heightened scrutiny); supra notes 35, 42 and accompanying text (discussing
relationship between constitutional scrutiny and symmetry).
367.
See D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1401.02(22) (West 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 37.2202(1)(a) (West 1967).
368.
See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Hooters Hires Based on Looks. So Do
Many Companies. And There's No Law Against It., NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 30, 2014),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118683/why-we-need-law-protect-againstappearance-discrimination [https://perma.cc/KYA5-3P7F].
369.

See DANIEL S. HAMERMESH,

BEAUTY PAYS: WHY ATTRACTIVE PEOPLE

ARE MORE SUCCESSFUL 47 (2011) (finding that an attractive worker out-earns an
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Symmetry is needed here to combat interlocking stereotypes. The
positive stereotypes that attractive workers benefit from are the flip side
of the negative stereotypes that hold unattractive workers back. This is
because of the "halo effect:" the better an individual looks, the better a
person we think she is.370 We consider attractive people "more sociable,
dominant, sexually warm, mentally healthy, intelligent, and socially
skilled . . . ."" The flip-side of this-the negative halo effect-means

that we also assume that unattractive people are less "sociable
dominant, sexually warm, mentally healthy, intelligent, and socially
skilled."372
Given the benefits that accrue to attractive workers, there might
seem to be few if any occasions for attractive workers to challenge
these stereotypes. But the halo effect may not always lead to positive
outcomes for workers. While attractive men may be considered better
leaders, the "sexually warm" part of the halo effect can work against
attractive women, making them less likely to be hired for high-level
jobs that require authority.373
Other instances in which attractiveness can serve as an impediment
in the labor market highlight the need for symmetry. Attractive people
may prompt jealousy that holds them back in their careers. Interviewers
are less likely to extend an offer to candidates of the same sex deemed

unattractive worker by an average of $230,000 over a lifetime and that even an
average-looking worker is still likely to earn $140,000 more over a lifetime than an
unattractive worker); Markus M. Mobius & Tanya S. Rosenblat, Why Beauty Matters,
96 AM. ECON. REv. 222, 225 (2006) (finding that subjects were willing to pay workers
of above-average beauty 10% to 15% more than workers of below average beauty, and
on this basis commenting that the gap is comparable for race or gender); Sean P. Salter
et al., Broker Beauty and Boon: A Study of Physical Attractiveness and Its Effect on
Real Estate Brokers' Income and Productivity, 22 APPLIED FIN. EcoN. 811, 821 (2012)
(finding that attractive real estate agents earn more and achieve higher selling prices
and extended marketing times).
370.
See Tonya K. Frevert & Lisa Slattery Walker, Physical Attractiveness
and Social Status, 8 Soc. COMPAss 313 (2014); Mobius & Rosenblat, supra note 369,
at 228.
371.
Alan Feingold, Good-Looking People Are Not What We Think, 111
PSYCHOL. BULL. 304, 304, 332 (1992); see also Alice H. Eagly et al., What Is
Beautiful Is Good, But. . .: A Meta-Analytic Review of Research on the Physical
Attractiveness Stereotype, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 109, 109 (1991).
372.
Feingold, supra note 371, at 304; see also Eagly et al., supra note 371,
at 109.
373.
See Frevert & Slattery Walker, supra note 370, at 316, 320; Elizabeth
Dwoskin, Is This Woman Too Hot to Be a Banker?, VILLAGE VOICE (June 1, 2010,
4:00 AM), http://www.villagevoice.com/news/is-this-woman-too-hot-to-be-a-banker6429442 [https://perma.cc/U56Z-TJQP] (describing lawsuit alleging that female banker
was fired because she was too attractive).
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to be more attractive than themselves.37 An attractive worker may even
be fired because her appearance makes her boss' spouse jealous."
And when it comes to implementation, it is not easy to draw a line
between an attractive and an unattractive worker."' This raises a
substantial challenge in determining who is in and who is out of the
protected class, both as a matter of defining the protected class, and in
applying this definition to the plaintiff in each case. Economists who
study the labor market impact of appearance use raters to provide
assessments of appearance.377 In a lawsuit, this would likely require
dueling experts of appearance fighting over whether the plaintiff is
attractive. As with concerns raised in the disability context, some
plaintiffs might not want to come forward to claim their rights if it
required proving that they were unattractive.
b. Sexual Orientation
Federal legislation to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is proposed almost every year.3 79 For this discrete trait,
multiple identities would be considered subordinated, including gay
men, lesbian women, and bisexual persons. Anticlassification concerns
could arise in cases where gay and lesbian workers are preferred, either
as role models, or on the basis of stereotypical customer preferences.*
374.
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375.
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not violate sex discrimination law).
376.
We might think that there is little agreement on what is attractive or
unattractive in the first place. But it turns out that beauty is not so much in the eye of
the beholder. As economist Daniel Hamermesh who studies the economics of
appearance explains: "[M]ost beholders view beauty similarly. Some people are
consistently regarded as above-average or even beautiful, while others are generally
regarded as plain or even downright homely." Sue Shellenbarger, On the Job, Beauty
Is
More
than
Skin-Deep,
WALL
ST.
J.,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203687504576655331418204842
[https://perma.cc/S34Z-39AQ] (last updated Oct. 27, 2011, 9:28 PM).
377.
See Hamermesh & Biddle, supra note 369, at 1174.
378.
See Burgdorf, supra note 53, at 536.
379.
Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistentand Pervasive Workplace
DiscriminationAgainst LGBT People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting
Discriminationand Providingfor Equal Employment Benefits, 45 Lov. L.A. L. REv.
715, 719 (2012). Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment. See NonDiscrimination Laws: State
by
State Information Map,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map
[https://perma.cc/Y3XY-TCRH] (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
See Naomi Schoenbaum, The Law of Intimate Work, 90 WASH. L. REv.
380.
1167, 1187 & n.103 (2015) (citing examples).

2017:69

The Casefor Symmetry in AntidiscriminationLaw 143

A symmetrical law would be necessary to challenge such employer
classifications.
Given the largely invisible nature of sexual orientation, and the
phenomenon of "passing," or "covering,""' there is a question as to
whether the cost of an asymmetrical mandate would be born by the
subordinated group. If decisionmakers cannot discern sexual
orientation, they will be unable to discriminate against the subordinated
group in hiring. In light of changes in attitudes about sexual orientation,
as well as the right to gay marriage, it is likely that fewer members of
the subordinated group will "pass," and instead will either overtly
indicate membership in the group (e.g., note an affiliation with gay or
lesbian groups on a resume, or refer to a same-sex partner), or will fail
to "cover" (e.g., allow a wedding announcement of a same-sex
marriage or images of a same-sex partner on a social media profile).382
The likelihood of the cost of the mandate falling on the subordinated
group, and thus the need for a symmetrical law, turns on precisely how
apparent sexual orientation has become.
Perhaps the greatest concern in the context of sexual orientation
comes in the realm of the practical. A protected-class approach would
require pinning down sexual orientation to a static identity. A tendency
to recognize sexual orientation as an unchanging biological
phenomenon-that one is "born this way" 3"-has been associated with
a greater recognition of gay rights.384 Nonetheless, we might still be
troubled by a protected-class approach. First, it does not take account
of the fluidity of sexual orientation.3 5 Some would-be plaintiffs may
not be willing to accept a static conception of their sexuality. Second,
the judicial classification of persons by sexual orientation reinforces
traditional concepts of sexuality. 386 When courts decide an individual's
sexual orientation, they tend to equate gay and lesbian identity with
expressions of desire that accord with conventional heterosexual notions
381.
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of intimacy.387 Moreover, there is the risk of "undercounting those who
do not fit neatly into the[] categor[y]" of lesbian, gay, or bisexual.38 8
When an individual has not openly identified as gay, courts may only
be willing to recognize her sexual orientation if she has expressed some
form of same-sex desire in the workplace.389 In one case brought under
state law, the plaintiffs coworkers harassed him for enjoying "gay boy
music" and referred to him as a "dick smoker. "39 The court dismissed
the claim because the plaintiff testified that he was a "heterosexual
male, was married, [and] fathered a child . . . ."391 Of course, this
worker could have been harassed on the basis of sexual orientation
whether or not he was actually gay. As discussed above, a symmetrical
law, which would put the focus on employer conduct rather than
membership in a protected class, would address these challenges.392
2. AREAS OF LAW
Areas of law outside of the employment context, including
education law, housing law, and constitutional law, also face the same
design question of symmetry or asymmetry. Certain considerations
from the employment context translate better than others to these
contexts. As for anticlassification concerns, they apply regardless of the
context in which these classifications arise. For anticlassificationists,
classifying individuals by protected trait to distribute access to valuable
goods is harmful, whether at work, school, or otherwise. 393 And the
practical and political concerns also transcend domains. The practical
concerns stem from conditioning relief on establishing membership in a
protected class, which would occur across domains with an
asymmetrical law. The political concerns too cut across domains
because the policy feedback mechanism could be expected to play out
similarly whenever there is redistribution of important goods.
Where the analysis shifts is the antisubordination purpose. The
phenomena of interlocking stereotypes and heterogeneity of
disadvantage can be seen in other areas of law, and would support at
least some measure of symmetry. As noted earlier, in her role as an
387.
388.
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advocate developing constitutional sex equality jurisprudence, Justice
Ginsburg consistently brought cases with male plaintiffs to challenge
state rules that relied on interlocking sex-based stereotypes.39
Heterogeneity of disadvantage can be seen in the education context,
where one of the seminal sex discrimination cases involved a man
challenging his rejection from an all-female nursing school.395
The real divergence arises when it comes to the cost of the
mandate. This is much less of a concern outside of employment. Most
employers, unlike most educational institutions, are aiming to maximize
profits, making cost a far more salient consideration.396 A
decisionmaker in the education context is far less likely to consider a
prospective student's cost as a reason not to admit her as compared
with a decisionmaker in the employment context. Moreover, many
educational institutions are specifically aiming to further diversity.397
Still further, the costs of antidiscrimination mandates are far more
salient in the employment context than the education context, and even
the housing context, because there is far more employment litigation
than education or housing litigation.398 Because of these differences
between the employment and education contexts, there is more reason
to believe that an asymmetrical law would lead to more progressive and
aggressive forms of affirmative action to achieve the diversity that
many schools, and many antisubordinationists, prefer.
The bottom line then is that it is harder to reach a conclusion that a
symmetrical design is superior in these other areas of antidiscrimination
law. While a full analysis and final recommendation for these other
contexts is beyond the scope of this paper, the point here is that the
design of any antidiscrimination law must take into account the
particulars of the domain in which it is operating. Reaching a
conclusion for constitutional law, which covers public action across
multiple domains-employment, education, housing, and beyond-is
particularly complex. This suggests that, at least from a normative
rather than a purely doctrinal perspective, the choice between symmetry
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and asymmetry in constitutional law should vary depending on the
context. While this is a far cry from current law, it may nonetheless be
justifiable from a more purpose-driven interpretive view.
CONCLUSION

This Article offers the first study of the design choice between
symmetry and asymmetry in antidiscrimination law. In so doing, it
takes steps towards understanding the consequences of an ongoing
puzzle of antidiscrimination law: the divide between symmetry and
asymmetry. For many proponents of antidiscrimination law, and
especially for advocates of subordinated groups, the results are
counterintuitive: that a symmetrical employment discrimination law that
protects everyone from discrimination in all directions is more effective
in achieving equality and improving the plight of disadvantaged groups
than an asymmetrical law targeted specifically at the group.
This surprising conclusion not only upends longstanding thinking
in the area of antidiscrimination law, but also provides an important
practical tool for advocates, one that is especially needed in light of
ongoing drives for legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, appearance, marital status, and a host of other
grounds. For those who are seeking to improve the circumstances of
subordinated groups in the labor market through antidiscrimination law,
far more serious consideration must be given to the choice between
symmetry and asymmetry.

